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Editorial

THE PASTOR AS THEOLOGIAN

THE question raised for the pastor in this editorial is not: Will he, or will he not be a theologian? The question is: Will he be a good theologian or a bad one? By "a bad theologian" is meant one whose theological assumptions, the assumptions by which he interprets the meaning of the Christian faith and its issue in life, remain unexamined, and are not subjected to the discipline of correction and reinterpretation by which growth in faith occurs.

The term "theologian" has several uses in common speech, some legitimate and some not. Too often today the term is one of abuse, used only to designate scholars who are thought to dwell in an "ivory tower" apart from life, where they spin complex theories of no relevance to the working pastor. It is easy to avoid a serious discipline one does not wish to undertake by dismissing it with scorn. Legitimately, however, the term "theologian" is applied to specialists in various fields of Christian study, such as Biblical, historical, or doctrinal. Use of the term in this sense would be clarified if the proper adjective accompanied it when a specialist in some department of theological study is meant. But "theologian" has legitimately a much broader reference as well; it refers to one who is concerned for the Word of God, for its true meaning and experience, and for its correct and relevant articulation. In this sense theology is the concern of every Christian, and to be a Christian is to be a theologian.

The pastor, however, has a special claim resting upon him to be a theologian, not necessarily as a specialist, yet in a more intensive and extensive way than a lay Christian. He is called to be the shepherd of his people. He is ordained to minister the Word of God to them in preaching and sacrament, to deepen their understanding of their faith, to enlarge their experience of it, and to help them to express it in their living. As such a shepherd he is especially called to be a theologian, indeed to be continually a student of theological thought. To deny that he has this role as a pastor, to let his theological concern grow dormant, to fail to keep his theological interest active and his theological understanding growing, is to fail in his ministry to his people.

The role of the pastor as theologian is three-fold. Firstly, he must endeavour to keep abreast of the latest thought in all fields of theological study. This he may do through publications such as this one and through reading selected significant books. In this task he may rightly look to the "specialist" for guidance. Secondly, he should endeavour to think through his work as a pastor theologically, and to see the vital relation between Christian truth and his practice as a preacher and pastor. Finally, he may

contribute significantly to the theological thought of the Church. In his pastoral work he may gain theological insights into the meaning of the Faith in the arena of his ministry where the Holy Spirit works in the lives and fellowship of his people. This last aspect of his role is seldom seen by the pastor, but it does, even if carried on only in a local area of the Church, make for dynamic relations between pastors and those whose business it is to develop the theology of the Church in special fields of study.

If this concept of the pastor's role as theologian seems to lay an impossible burden upon the busy pastor, there is need for pastors to reconsider the meaning of the ministry, and to reassess their labours and their use of time, so that place may be found for this most important duty. The Church's life will be mentally, morally, spiritually and hence evangelically shallow unless her chosen leaders speak and act out of serious wrestling with theology.

G.W.B.

The Trinity and the Enhypostasia

CYRIL C. RICHARDSON

ONE learns from one's critics; and I should like in this article to address myself to a fundamental point which has been raised by critics (both the sympathetic and the censorious) of my recent book *The Doctrine of the Trinity* (Abingdon, 1958). The issue is this: Does not an orthodox doctrine of the Person of Christ demand the dogma that in the divine life there are Father and Son, who mutally love each other? Do not the Gospel record and the divine consciousness of Jesus require a trinitarian formulation, in which Father and Son are appropriate terms to distinguish *personal* principles of the divine life? The doctrine of the Trinity is essential (it is claimed) to Christianity, because its primary purpose is to guard the truth of Christology. It is not first a speculative doctrine about God as absolute and as related; but a Christological doctrine which safeguards the divine person of the Incarnate Lord.

I must confess that while I have, to some measure, treated this question in my book, I have not treated it adequately. For it has been my general assumption that He who was active in Jesus of Nazareth, accomplishing the world's salvation, was God in his relations with the world. The paradoxical principles of God as Absolute and God as Related, I have urged, cannot form a trinitarian pattern; and, indeed, the symbols Father and Son are highly inappropriate for them. To this paradox I will return later. Our immediate concern here, however, is with the implications of an orthodox Christology.

In another article (*Religion in Life*, Autumn, 1958) I have tried to show that the *idea* lying behind the *enhypostasia* is the essence of orthodox Christology. It was the basic premise of the Chalcedonian formula, and of its further explication at III Constantinople. The idea is this: the Person of Jesus of Nazareth was the Second Person of the Trinity. The center, subject, metaphysical Ego of Jesus was the Word of God. In the incarnation the Second Person of the Trinity assumed all the attributes of human (even fallen, human) nature. But the metaphysical identity of this particular instance of human nature was the Word of God, and not *a* man. The humanity never had independent existence in its own right. It had no ontological reality apart from its union with the Word which was its *hypostasis*. The Logos (as Cyril of Alexandria was never tired of urging) assumed "flesh," and *a* human being. This is, to be sure, a moderate form of Monophysitism, and indeed a highly refined type of Apollinarianism. Yet it is the orthodox position. It raises many serious problems (as I have tried to indicate in the article to which I have referred); but it is certainly a tenable position and has been championed by Karl Barth as well as more recently

by Vincent Taylor (*The Person of Christ in New Testament Teaching*, Macmillan, 1958). Taylor sets the doctrine, to be sure, within a kenotic context, and does not seem to me to fully understand the *enhypostasia* which he eschews. Yet his fundamental point of view is precisely that; and indeed he is even more Monophysite than III Constantinople in his denial of two wills (or energies) in Christ. Be that as it may, there can be no question that the orthodox Christology affirms that the center, subject, principle of identity, metaphysical Ego (or whatever term one chooses to express the same idea) of Jesus was the Second Person of the Trinity.

I do not wish to argue the validity of this position here. My purpose is rather to wrestle with its supposed Trinitarian implications *on the assumption it is true*. For myself, I find it an inadequate Christology, but it is tenable, and certainly highly respectable. What I want to show is that *classical* trinitarianism, *far from being its necessary corollary, involves insuperable problems for it*. I want thus to turn the tables on my critics, and to force them to see the difficulties of their own position, which they almost invariably fail to face.

If one holds this Christological viewpoint, one is forced at the very outset to decide in what sense "Father" and "Son" are used in the Gospel record with respect to God and Jesus. Two possibilities are open to theologians of this persuasion. The terms may, on the one hand, refer to the *human nature* of Jesus, in its relation to God, its Creator. Or, on the other hand, such terms may be expressive of *trinitarian relations in the Godhead*. We may, that is, read off divine relations in terms of Jesus praying to his heavenly Father; *or* we may regard such prayers as the condition of finitude, which the Second Person of the Trinity accepts, but which are *not* congruous with his divine nature and *not* expressive of relations in the Godhead. Let us consider the implications of these two possibilities in turn.

We begin with the assumption that the divine consciousness of Jesus expresses a relation within the Godhead. This is the view of Leonard Hodgson and Vincent Taylor (among others), and has a long history reaching back to the Patristic period. Jesus (in this view) speaks to his Father, *not* as a creature addressing his Creator, but as the divine Son addressing the Father who begot him from all eternity. The doctrine of the Spirit would similarly rest upon the assumption that, in promising the Paraclete, Jesus (as divine Son) is talking of the Third Person of the Trinity. We cannot pursue the question of the Spirit here, however; but must confine ourselves to the first two Persons of the Trinity. For it is this distinction which determines the whole structure of trinitarian thinking.

Now, what is the distinction between Father and Son on this first premise? What is the character of Father over against Son? It is at this point that untold confusion enters the picture. For, to answer this question, a structure of thought from Middle Platonism was introduced, and has remained to the present day to plague trinitarian thinking. I cannot here review its history and the way it came into Christian thought. It has its origin in Old Testament metaphorical expressions of God's action which in the

inter-Testamental period and in philosophic writers like Philo, take over themes from Greek philosophy. Here I am only concerned with the basic idea itself. It is this: that God acts by mediators. He does not act directly, but employs intermediaries to fulfill his purposes. Primarily he acts by the Logos, by which he created and sustains and redeems the world.

This idea involves two assumptions: (1) that God is not exhausted in his activity—he does not in his "wholeness" come forth. Always his absolute and transcendent nature is guarded, and set over against his activity. He is always "beyond," despite his appearing. In Greek thought (and in the Pauline "Kyrios") there lurks the belief that God's action is secondary to, and inferior to, his real Being. Hence the subordinationism of early Patristic writers. But the triumph of the *homoousios* in Nicene Christianity assured the conviction that it was the divine nature itself, and not an inferior mediator, which created and redeemed.

(2)The second assumption is that the mediating or acting principle in the divine is *begotten* of the Father. This is a metaphor for the Platonic notion of the fecundity of the absolute. God's absolute and transcendent nature is ontologically prior. His creativity and action are secondary, and *derived* from his Beyondness. This assumption has all too long gone unchallenged in Christian orthodoxy with its Greek roots. One result of this has been that my attack upon the idea has seemed to some critics unintelligible. To many Christians the notion partakes of a self-evident and necessary truth. Yet it involves a logical inconsistency, which Parmenides (against Plato) saw. The Many *cannot* be derived from the One, the Relative from Absolute. To do so, is to compromise the first term of a paradox. If the Many is implicit in the One, the One is no longer the One. If God's Absolute nature is the source of his relatedness, the Absolute is no longer Absolute. These notions can only be expressed paradoxically. The principle of derivation only reads back the paradox into the first term of the dilemma. Where Parmenides went wrong was in denying the *reality* of the Many. His basic point, however, was correct: that the Many cannot be derived from the One.

This problem runs through all Christian theology, and its only possible statement is paradoxical. One must both *affirm* and *deny* that motion and non-being are in the Godhead. To fail to do this is to get into the insuperable difficulties of Aquinas who presents the *actus purus* in such a way that it logically cannot create the world or even love; or of Tillich who says, "God as being itself transcends non-being absolutely" (S.T. 1.270) and yet "God as created life includes the finite and, with it, non-being" (S.T. ibid.). The fact is one can only express God's absolute and related character in paradoxical terms. Unless we do this, we either state flat contradictions without recognizing them as such (as Tillich seems to do), or we invent meaningless categories, as Aquinas does (S.T. 1a, q.27), with his distinction of motion *ad intra* and *ad extra*, which is really to talk about "motionless motion." The contention, furthermore, that the Process Theology has solved the problem by saying that God is A and R (to use Charles Hartshorne's

terms)—absolute only in love, and relative in other respects—is equally fallacious. For one absolute implies *all* the others. How could God's love be absolute unless he had the infinite power of being in *every* respect to sustain this? If he lacked wisdom and power in an absolute sense, his love would be threatened *qua* love.

In short, the idea that God in his motion, creativity and limitation is *begotten* of his absolute nature, is derived from Plato's unsatisfactory notion of the fecundity of the absolute.

I have been at pains to outline these assumptions, for they are essential to classical trinitarian doctrine. The Father and Son of the Trinity are distinguished in terms that the Father does things *through* the Son. This is still the Eastern view, as it was the patristic view. The Son brings to actuality (as Gregory of Nyssa says) what the Father, the origin of all, plans and wills. Now to read Jesus' relation to his Father in terms like these is to make no sense at all. It involves confusing paradoxical principles of the divine with persons who have dialogue with each other and love each other. And it involves the further false assumption that the one is begotten of the other. Innumerable nonsensical questions arise from such notions. We ask: how was the world sustained in actuality while the Son condescended to the incarnation? Godet answers: by the Father taking over the Son's cosmic role temporarily for thirty years! Or the answer is given: we simply do not know (Taylor). But the deepest difficulty lies in *personalizing* paradoxical divine attributes. We are saying Jesus (as God in his relations) is praying to the Father (as God in his absolute transcendence). Not only is the term "Father" highly unfortunate for such an idea, seeing in the Biblical record it refers to the Living God in his active relations with his children, but the whole structure of thought is open to question, once the paradoxical nature of God as absolute and related is grasped.

To some measure Western Catholic thought since Augustine has revised the typical Patristic and Greek viewpoint. We cannot pursue it here; it is outlined in my book (Chapter 5). It must suffice to comment that the revision has been far from complete; and on the *central* issue why it was the Son and not the Father who became incarnate, the old Logos notions still survive. The doctrine of the appropriations, which tried to do away with the idea of the Son as the actualizer or agent of the divine plans, was never extended (as it *logically* should have been) to the "missions" of the Trinity. Thus in Augustine, Aquinas and western Catholicism today the old confusion still remains. Its most remarkable Protestant representative is Karl Barth.

If then (to conclude the first of the two alternatives of the *enhypostasia,* with which we started), we assume the prayers of Jesus reflect a dialogue in the Godhead between two Persons, we can only say this is a fact of revelation. We are not justified in giving any other character to the terms Father and Son in this connection than to say Jesus is the Son of his Father, and both are God. To introduce the whole way of thinking from Middle Platonism with its Logos doctrine is to confuse this fact of revelation with

philosophical issues which are irrelevant, and which on analysis appear to be incorrectly stated. When wedded to the relation of Jesus to his Father, these issues not only confuse the question but end up in nonsensical statements. A Trinity certainly can be affirmed; but it is somewhat remote from the *classical* doctrine of the Trinity. We can say there are three Persons in the Godhead because Jesus' divine consciousness implies this, and because his life of prayer with his Father expresses it, and the gift of the Spirit confirms it. But these distinctions in the Godhead have little to do with the classical ones, which are grounded in the Logos doctrine (e.g. parts of the Nicene Creed), and which involve the contrast between God in his transcendent and self-sufficient glory and God in his active relations with the world.

The second possibility for those who affirm the *enhypostasia*, is to interpret the Gospel relation of Jesus to his heavenly Father in terms of his *human* nature. It would be contended that the conditions of finitude imply the relation of creature to Creator; and in his prayers to God Jesus voices what is appropriate to his human status. It is his human not his divine consciousness which is involved. Here he speaks and acts as *man*; and although the ultimate metaphysical subject of such actions is the Second Person of the Trinity, this is not given direct expression in the address to the heavenly Father. Just as Jesus eats, drinks and suffers as *man*, so he prays as *man*. Hence the Father-Son relation is not a trinitarian one, but a condition of mortal existence. In short, to the extent we take seriously the limitations imposed by incarnation we cannot read off divine relations from words and actions of the human scene. We may well believe that behind the incarnate life lies the Second Person of the Trinity; but we cannot speak of this Person and his relations with the other divine Persons in terms proper to the incarnate life. For these terms are qualified by the human nature and bespeak relations between creature and Creator. If the Second Person of the Trinity condescended to men's estate, and emptied himself of the divine glory for our salvation, then his conscious acts are in terms of a *human* consciousness, and not of a divine one. The metaphysical Ego of Jesus is not *identical* with his human knowledge of himself.

Such a position has to face grave issues for trinitarian thinking. For the terms Father and Son are now divested of a divine connection. They belong to the human nature. We have no way of knowing, therefore, whether there is any personal distinction between the metaphysical Ego of Jesus and God the Father himself. Why should we strive to make *any* ontological and personal distinctions in the Godhead? Should we not content ourselves with saying that behind this human life there was God, acting for our salvation?

The answer must surely be in the affirmative. For there is no way of knowing and no necessity for assuming any distinction of Father and Son. Indeed, as soon as a distinction is pressed upon us, we instantly discover it arises from the faulty assumptions of the Logos theology, and Father and Son are contrasted in terms that ultimately derive from the notion of the fecundity of the absolute. The usual distinction concerns Patripassianism.

It is said the Son is nearer to suffering than the Father. The Son can appropriate suffering in a way the Father cannot, since the Father is the absolute, the Son God in his relations. But this involves all the difficulty we have already surveyed in connection with the absolute-related problem. There simply is no reason for saying that the *hypostasis* of Jesus differs from the First Person of the Trinity to the extent that the one and not the other can appropriate suffering. We are mixing up paradoxical, metaphysical principles in the Godhead with Persons who have relations with each other. Another way of putting it is to assume that the *kenosis* is possible for the Second Person and not for the First, since God must still exercise his Lordship and sustaining of the world, during the incarnation. There must, therefore, be two Persons. But this is an equally faulty way of thinking. For what is needed to express this truth adequately is a recognition of the paradoxical nature of God, not the assumption of two Persons in the Trinity, so that the ultimate Ego of Jesus stands (*qua* Person) over against the Person of the Father. Again we are mixing up metaphysical principles in God with Persons.

Finally, it is often contended that the Trinity is essential to express the reality of God as love. Only in a relation of Persons can love find its fulfillment. It is inadequate to say God loves himself, for the outgoing quality of love lies precisely in the Lover having another than himself to love. I have treated this problem in Chapter 5 of my book. Here I will only recall that while there is value in the social analogy in our thinking about God, the terms do not have to be those of Father and Son. Indeed, once we assume that Jesus' address to the Father is *not* indicative of a divine relation, but bespeaks the conditions of finitude, there is no reason for using the terms Father and Son to express the social analogy with the Godhead. All we need to say is that the ultimate Ego of Jesus loves and is loved by another Person of the Godhead. There is no need to say this ultimate Ego is derived *from* that other Person. Indeed, to do so invariably involves us in the faulty thinking of the Logos theology.

We conclude then that while some conception of Persons in the Godhead may be a consequence of the *enhypostasia*, the *classical* trinitarian doctrine is *not* a necessary corollary of it. Those who would read off divine relations from Gospel sayings in which Jesus addresses his Father, can speak of Father, Son and Spirit as divinely revealed Persons of the Trinity. But no other content can be given to the doctrine; and the attempt to interpret it further in Logos terms is open to grave objections. Those, on the other hand, who regard Jesus' conscious relation with his Father as an aspect of the *human* nature, cannot even establish that the terms Father and Son are appropriate to the Godhead. On the grounds of the social analogy they may urge that the ultimate Ego of Jesus loves and is loved by a Person or Persons of the Godhead. But nothing more can be said without introducing metaphysical considerations which are seriously open to question.

Jesus and Paul*

FRANCIS WRIGHT BEARE

EVERYONE, when he turns from the pages of the Gospels to the epistles of St. Paul, is conscious of a change of atmosphere. To many, perhaps we might even say to most readers, it seems as if we had moved from the simple to the complex—from something easy to something excessively difficult to understand. The Gospels may indeed offer us some rather puzzling pictures. They bring us into a world that seems to be populated by devils—devils which enter into a man and make him deaf and dumb, or send him insane, or afflict him with epilepsy; and when Jesus drives out the devils, the dumb speak and the deaf hear, the madmen are restored to sanity and take their places again in normal life, clothed and in their right mind, and the epileptics are healed of their painful and distressing affliction. But if these stories of men possessed by devils, and the miracle-stories generally, appear strange and perhaps wholly incredible to our scientifically conditioned, twentieth century minds, we find it easy to write these things off as reflections of first century ignorance of the nature of mental and bodily disease, or as the queer superstitions of Galilean peasants. But when it comes to the teachings—here, at least, we feel ourselves to be on solid ground. Anyone can appreciate the simple ethical pronouncements of the Sermon on the Mount, or feel himself moved by the parable of the Good Samaritan or the story of the Prodigal Son. In comparison with these things Paul seems to bring us into a rather confusing atmosphere of theological controversy, where our ears are assailed by strange words such as "justification," and "sanctification," and "redemption."

But a good many readers have something more against St. Paul than the mere fact that he seems to be very hard to understand, and to make the Christian faith needlessly difficult, while the Gospels present it so simply and make it so easy to understand. Let me say in passing that this is an entirely false notion, which lasts only as long as we make no serious effort to understand the Gospels. I would say without hesitation that the Gospels are far more difficult writings than the epistles of St. Paul; and that there is nothing in the world more difficult to fathom than the teachings of Jesus. It remains true that the average reader thinks that the Gospels are easy, and the Epistles difficult to understand and to interpret.

The more serious charge against St. Paul is not that he is obscure and difficult, while the Gospels are easy to understand; but that he teaches a

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different gospel from the gospel which was proclaimed by Jesus. Sometimes this difference is expressed as a distinction between "the Gospel of Jesus," and "the Gospel about Jesus"; and it is affirmed that Paul did not preach the Gospel *of* Jesus, but the Gospel *about* Jesus. It is held by such critics—or some of them—that Jesus preached a simple ethic of love, unembarrassed by dogma; while Paul introduced a formidable dogmatic structure, based on the doctrine that the crucified Jesus is the Son of God, who came down from heaven for us men and for our salvation; that his death is the means of our redemption, the expiation for our sins; that God raised him from the dead and exalted him to heavenly glory; and that he will come again in glory to judge the living and the dead and to reign as King on earth, an earth which under his rule is transformed into the Kingdom of God. Along with this, we are told, Paul introduces a mystical sacramentalism strangely resembling the mystery religions of Greece and the Orient with their doctrines of a dying and rising god; a baptism which represents and sacramentally effects the participation of the Christian with Christ in death and in the new life which death cannot touch; and a holy Supper which sustains the new life with the food of immortality, which is the body and blood of Christ. This religion, it is claimed, has very little to do with the religion of Jesus himself, or with the teachings given by him to his disciples, which are preserved in the Gospels. Worst of all, our critic will go on, it is this dogmatic, mystical and sacramental religion taught by Paul which has perpetuated itself as historic Christianity, while the simple religion of Jesus was submerged. Paul has thus become the real founder of Christianity, while Jesus has been by-passed.

Let me deal with the second point first, because it is simpler to settle. The fact is that the Apostle was never in a position to change the character of the Christian faith or to reshape the chief teachings of the Christian community, in any substantial way. People are able to imagine his doing anything of the sort only because they forget the actual historical circumstances of his career. The activity of St. Paul as a Christian extends over a period of not more than thirty years; the part of it best known to us, from the beginning of his work in Macedonia to his death in Rome, extends over only fourteen years. These years were spent in and around seven centres, seven cities of the ancient world: at the first, Damascus and Antioch in Syria and Tarsus in Cilicia; later, Philippi and Thessalonica in Macedonia and Corinth in Greece; and then, Ephesus in Asia Minor. For the last five years of his life he was a prisoner in the hands of the Romans. During these years other Christian teachers who owed nothing to Paul were at work in other parts of the world. Some went to Rome and founded the great Roman church; some brought the gospel to Alexandria in Egypt; some travelled up the valley of the Rhone into the heart of Gaul, the country which we know as France; others made their way with the word of salvation to North Africa and to Spain; and it is likely that some went beyond the limits of the Roman Empire to establish churches in the lands of the Parthian kings, in Meso-

potamia and Iran and regions farther east. These missionaries were not disciples of Paul; many of them had not the slightest idea of what he was doing or teaching. Unfortunately we have no documents telling of their work. The documents which tell of the spread of Christianity in the Apostolic Age are all related to St. Paul. We have his letters, nine or ten of them, written by himself to churches which he had founded or which he intended to visit; and in the book of Acts, we have a colorful sketch of his career as a missionary, his movements from city to city, his adventures, his conflicts, and his successes in establishing churches. We have no letters from other missionaries of the time and no story of their doings; and because we know so much about St. Paul and so little about any other Christians of the time, we form the unconscious impression that he dominated the whole life of the Apostolic Age. This impression is entirely false, and it ought not to take more than a moment's consideration to make anyone realize that it is entirely false. Paul is perhaps the greatest figure of the time (we cannot even say that, for we simply do not know enough about the character and accomplishments of the others); but there certainly were others—many others. Besides the Twelve of the gospel story who are little more than names to us, there were countless others whose very names are unknown; and Paul was not their teacher. Most of them, we may safely say, knew nothing about him; few of them ever had any opportunity to learn anything from him either by word of mouth or by letter. During his own lifetime, his influence was confined to the limited regions in which he himself founded churches; and great areas of Christian activity, including Palestine itself, and Jerusalem the mother church, owed nothing to his teaching. Indeed, even in the regions which he himself evangelized, his authority was constantly being called in question. By some elements of the mother church itself he was bitterly assailed, and they kept sending representatives into his own mission fields to belittle him and to draw away his converts into their own narrow racial and national exclusiveness.

One must not suppose, either, that Paul made his influence felt outside his own missions by means of his letters. They had no printing presses in those days. Every copy of every document had to be written out by hand, on costly writing materials such as papyrus or parchment; and there was no question of making copies of St. Paul's letters and sending them to all the churches everywhere. The churches at Corinth or Jerusalem or Antioch would not be particularly interested in a letter which the apostle wrote to the Christians of Thessalonica or of Philippi; and there is not the slightest reason to suppose that any of his letters circulated during his lifetime beyond the local congregation to which it was addressed. Neither in person nor by his letters was St. Paul ever in a position to change the whole character of Christianity in the way that has been imagined.

Nor would it be true to suppose that his influence made itself felt more widely and powerfully after his death. It is a fact that towards the end of the first century, when Paul had been dead for some thirty years, his letters

were collected and published, and the collection was widely circulated through the churches. Every Christian writer of the second century whose works have been preserved shows acquaintance with the collected epistles of St. Paul. But it must be said that not one of them is a Paulinist. They do not use his epistles as the source of their own theological and religious ideas, but employ them in the service of the common faith. They share his faith in Christ the Son of God, but they by no means echo his theology. Like many of us today, they hardly understand the main lines of his thinking, partly because they are not actively concerned with the controversies over Jewish legalism ("the righteousness which is of the law")—the setting against which most of his theological statements are worked out. They find in his writings many high and magnificent conceptions, many golden phrases in which Christian faith and hope and love are given glorious expression; and these they seize upon, as we still do ourselves, without caring too much about the general structure of his thought. Through the letters the thought of St. Paul enters as one significant element into the complex structure of catholic Christianity, but it is by no means the determining element. Christianity is first of all the faith of a living community, bound in a shared life, worshipping one Lord, animated by one Spirit, serving the one God and Father of all. It continues to be influenced directly by the sayings of Jesus himself, known in part through the Gospels and in part through the oral tradition which (through the second century) lived on independently of the Gospels. It was influenced also, and more strongly as time went on, by the Greek philosophy of the age, especially Stoicism and Platonic mysticism. And it never ceased to be influenced by the Old Testament scriptures, which it interpreted as prophecy and prefiguration of Christ and the church. We must think of historic Christianity, catholic Christianity, as a great river into which flow tributary streams. Jesus and his teachings are the headwaters, which themselves carry rich accumulations from the Old Testament; Paul is one of the main tributaries; but the river receives mighty contributions from other sources as well, and the Pauline tributary never becomes the main stream. Historic Christianity does not in any sense result from a displacement of the religion which Jesus taught by some very different religion which Paul taught. That serious scholars should ever have thought so is one of the eccentricities, let us say rather outright absurdities, of Biblical scholarship.

But now we must come to the main question: is Paul the proponent of a substantially different religion from the religion of the Gospels? Is his "Gospel about Jesus" really something different from the "Gospel of Jesus," the gospel which Jesus himself preached? The answer to this question, I am afraid I must say, cannot be unequivocally "Yes" or "No." It must be rather: "In one sense, Yes—Paul's gospel is different; and in another sense, No—Paul is essentially one with Jesus, his *epigone* and his interpreter." It has been said that "Jesus did not come to preach the Gospel; he came in order that there might be a gospel to preach." Jesus looks forward to the

Cross and the Resurrection; Paul looks back upon them as accomplished facts in which the saving power of God has been revealed.[1] Jesus spoke of God as his Father, out of his unique and direct knowledge and unmediated communion; Paul speaks of God as "the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," and his own knowledge of God as Father is a knowledge given to him in Christ and through Christ. It will be agreed, therefore, that in some senses the gospel of Paul *is* different from the gospel which Jesus preached; it is in fact a gospel *about* Jesus.

Yet this contrast can be, and often is, overdrawn. The gospel which Jesus preached is also inseparable from the mystery and the wonder of his own person.[2] The teaching of Jesus is not truly conceived when it is represented as a simple system of ethics, a doctrine of love to God and love to man. Jesus was not crucified for teaching a simple system of ethics. The ethic which he taught was the way of life *for such as would become his disciples*, for men and women who would follow him along the way which leads to Calvary. His ethical teaching is rooted and grounded in faith, just as certainly as the ethical teaching of St. Paul is rooted and grounded in faith—faith in the God who raises the dead, faith in the heavenly Father who is gracious to the unthankful and to the disobedient and who will not withhold his good gifts from those who ask of him, even though they deserve nothing at his hands, faith in a God to whom all things are possible. The ethic of Jesus is fundamentally a religious ethic, wholly based upon a right relationship with God; and this right relationship with God (which St. Paul calls "justification") is a relationship which Jesus himself creates and makes possible, a relationship into which men enter through fellowship with him. It is to his disciples that he promises the Kingdom: "Fear not, little flock; it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the Kingdom" (Luke 12:32). The gospel of Jesus is simply not to be divorced from Jesus himself. He *is* his own gospel, and it is by following him in personal discipleship that we learn to live the kind of life which he commends to us in the Sermon on the Mount. And that life cannot be lived except in him.

We need not hesitate to affirm that despite all the differences, Paul is essentially one with Jesus in the substance of the gospel which he preaches. The differences are more apparent than real, more superficial than fundamental. Jesus is beyond all question the founder of the religion which Paul propagates. The differences are above all differences in the manner of presentation, and these stem in part from the different background and education of the two men, and partly from the differences in the people for

1. See the admirable discussion by Anton Fridrichsen in his essay, "Jesus, St. John and St. Paul," in *The Root of the Vine: Studies in Biblical Theology*, ed. A. Fridrichsen (London: Dacre Press, 1953), pp. 37 ff.

2. Cf. the remarks of J. Jeremias, in his book *The Parables of Jesus* (tr. S. H. Hooke; London: SCM, 3rd imp., 1956): "In attempting to recover the original significance of the parables, one thing above all becomes evident: it is that all the parables of Jesus compel his hearers to come to a decision about his person and mission. . . . For he has been manifested whose veiled kingliness shines through every word and through every parable—the Saviour" (p. 159).

whom the teaching is designed. Jesus is a man of the village and of the countryside; he draws his illustrations from the wild flowers that bloom in the fields and the birds that make their nests in the shrubs; from the farmer who sows his grain and puts in the sickle when the harvest is ready; from the fisherman bringing his catch to shore and sorting it. Paul is a city man; his illustrations are taken from the boxing ring and the race course and the slave market; even more, he is a man of letters, and he inclines to take his illustrations from literature, from the stories of Abraham and the oracles of Isaiah. He has had the professional training of the Rabbi, and he uses the peculiar methods of interpreting scripture which he had been taught in the rabbinical schools. Jesus has nothing of that at all: the first impression which he made on people was of the great difference between his way of teaching and that of the rabbis. "The people were astonished at his teaching," we read, "for he taught as one having authority, and not as their scribes" (Mark 1:22).

Again, there was all the difference in the world in the people for whom the teaching was intended. Jesus confined his ministry almost entirely to his own people, the Jews; and he taught in the language spoken by the masses of the people of Palestine, that is to say, in Aramaic. Paul was the Apostle of the Gentiles, and he addressed himself almost entirely to non-Jews, to the Greeks and the Greek-speaking peoples of Asia Minor and the Greek peninsula; and of course the city of Rome. All his letters that have come down to us are written in Greek. Naturally, he sought for ways of making his gospel intelligible to Greeks; he made no bones about borrowing words and phrases and good ideas from the religions and philosophies of the Greek world, if only he could bring them into the service of the gospel. The kingdom of God, of which Jesus spoke so often, meant nothing to a Greek; and so Paul hardly ever makes use of the phrase when he is writing to Greeks. The title Messiah ("Anointed One") meant a great deal to a Jew, but nothing at all to a Greek; consequently in Paul the title Christ ("Messiah") becomes a proper name, and he gives Jesus the cult-title which the Greeks knew well—the title *Kyrios*, "Lord." He speaks to them of "Jesus Christ our Lord." All this, and much more in his teaching is nothing but the transposing of the gospel into the language and the thought-forms of another people, the kind of adjustment that was needed if the gospel of Jesus was to be brought effectually into the Greek world.

In this brief space it is not possible to do more than give a hint of the lines along which the answers to our questions may be sought. Even this is sufficient to justify us in taking St. Paul at his own estimate as Christ's man, Christ's follower, Christ's ambassador to the Gentile world: "an Apostle of Jesus Christ by the will of God." Certainly he never ceases to affirm his dependence on Christ. This passionate defender of freedom will even call himself "a slave of Christ Jesus"; and will tell his converts: "We preach not ourselves, but Christ Jesus the Lord, and ourselves your slaves for the sake of Jesus" (2 Cor. 4:5). And in the most moving words he speaks again

and again of what Christ means to him. "To me to live is Christ," he tells us, and "I count all things as loss because of the surpassing excellence of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord, for whose sake I have suffered the loss of all things" (Phil. 1:21 and 3:8); and again, "I am crucified with Christ, and it is no longer I that live, but Christ lives in me; and the life that I now live in the flesh, I live by faith in God and in Christ, who loved me and gave himself for me" (Gal. 2:20).

Supplementary Note

There is nothing whatever to indicate that the primitive church in Jerusalem, or any elements in it, differed from St. Paul either in the matter of Christology or in sacramental practices and ideas. The notion of a non-dogmatic, non-sacramental Christianity, which was nothing more than the ethic of prophetic Judaism brought to its highest and purest expression, is a fantasy of nineteenth century "liberalism" (falsely so-called). The bitter disputes in which St. Paul was engaged with some elements of the primitive church were not over Christology or sacramentalism, but over the demand that Gentile converts to Christianity should be circumcized and charged to keep the law. The challenge to St. Paul is accurately summed up in Acts 15: 1 and 5: "Some men came down from Judaea and were teaching the brethren (at Antioch), 'Except you are circumcized . . . you cannot be saved.' . . . Some believers who belonged to the sect of the Pharisees rose up and said, 'It is necessary to circumcize them, and to charge them to keep the law of Moses.' " Against this attempt to keep Christianity in leading-strings, Paul struggled with all the forces of his mind and heart. Such opponents were to him nothing but "false brethren, furtively brought in, who wormed their way into the church to spy on our freedom which we have in Christ Jesus, that they might enslave us" (Gal. 2:4). This marks out the area of conflict, and no one today would question that Paul here stood for the truth, in the spirit of Jesus his Master. But there is no suggestion anywhere that his dogmatic and sacramental teachings represented a divergence from the religion of the primitive church.[3] On the contrary, he explicitly tells us that his account of the institution of the Eucharist came to him through the tradition of the church (1 Cor. 11:23f.); he takes it for granted that the Roman church, which was not indebted to him for its instruction in the faith, will have been taught that Christian baptism brings the believer into mystical union with Christ in death and resurrection (Rom. 6:1 ff.—the phrase "Do you not know?" in v. 3, clearly implies that Paul is not introducing a basically new idea, but is appealing to a commonly accepted Christian position); and when he reminds the Corinthians of what he delivered to them among the things of the first importance (1 Cor. 15:3), he affirms that these belonged to what he himself had received by tradition, and were the

3. *New Testament Theology*, by Ethelbert Stauffer, tr. John Marsh (London: SCM, 1955). "The dogma is as old as the Church herself. . . . Both dogma-making Church and the Church-making dogma are pre-Pauline in origin" (p. 256).

basis of the preaching of the other apostles as well. "Whether it was I or they, so we preach and so you believed" (v. 11). These things of the first importance were not ethical teachings at all, but were essentially dogmatic in character.

Again, it must be observed that the gospels themselves are far from undogmatic documents; they are not simply biographies of a human Jesus whose chief significance is that he was an ethical teacher. Like St. Paul, they preach Jesus as the Son of the living God; and every one of them is basically the story of his Passion and Death, with an introduction. They are concerned primarily to preach Christ crucified; such teaching as they give is subsidiary to the story of the Cross.

The notion of an undogmatic, non-sacramental faith which Jesus taught and which the early church maintained until St. Paul introduced his complications of sacrament and dogma is not based upon any historical evidence and cannot be scientifically deduced from analysis of the documents. It is a product of the imagination of scholars who hoped to show that Jesus taught the kind of moralistic religion which seemed to them appropriate for an enlightened and sensible person. In a way, it was the transference to a high level of the constant attempts which people make to remould Jesus in their own image, or rather in the image of what they themselves have come to regard as the highest and best. Jesus is not so easily brought into any image that we can form, even the highest and best. Professor H. J. Cadbury, who long ago warned us of *The Peril of Modernizing Jesus*, has more recently reminded us that Jesus himself "is reported as having said, 'No one knows the Son, but the Father.' "[4]

4. *Jesus: What Manner of Man* (New York: Macmillan, 1947), p. 123.

Tillich's "Method of Correlation"

KENNETH HAMILTON

ONE of the reasons why the thought of Paul Tillich is so impressive and challenging is that it is a *system*, as original and personal in its conception and structure as anything a skilled architect or engineer might plan. And his system, so he tells us in the Introduction to his *Systematic Theology*, is an attempt to use a particular method. Here also the comparison with architecture and engineering holds good, for mastery in those disciplines depends on the ability to exploit to the full a suitable technique of construction; the method chosen must be adequate to meet all the demands which arise out of the task on hand, and should this method prove faulty, no other virtue in design avails anything.

Therefore there is good reason for examining the method which Tillich has chosen in constructing his theological system, since what we think about his method will determine how we view his system as a whole. And, although the system has not yet been published in its entirety, the first three parts of the *Systematic Theology* are now available, together with a number of other writings dealing with different aspects of the system. So we have been given enough to be able to see how his method works out in practice as well as in idea.

I

The method which Tillich uses he calls the "method of correlation," and it has been chosen in order to solve the apologetic problem of "Christianity and the modern mind." It aims at achieving a synthesis between the perennial message of Christianity and the concrete temporal situation in which the message must be received:

> It tries to correlate the questions implied in the situation with the answers implied in the message . . . It correlates questions and answers, situation and message, human existence and divine manifestation.[1]

By means of this method Tillich hopes to steer between the errors of over-compromising liberalism and of static orthodoxy. Rejecting both "naturalism" and "supranaturalism," he wishes to do justice to the classical Christian belief that revelation is more than man can discover for himself, and yet at the same time recognize the essential element of human receptivity—the way in which revelation finds expression within the conditions of existence. Through the use of the method of correlation he hopes to show how reason and revelation are to be reconciled and a solution to the riddle of existence supplied by religious faith. This reconciling and explanatory work he sees

1. *Systematic Theology* I, p. 8.

as theology's proper task, so that theology is essentially apologetics; and apologetics is "answering theology," the most clear and most satisfying answer to the question man asks in every age: the question, "What is truth?"

Now a method of correlation, in itself, can mean very little. When such a method is used we know that different things are being put in relationship to one another. But whether this activity is either profitable or justifiable we cannot tell until we know enough about the things being correlated to know what relationships can, in fact, exist between them. Astrology, for instance, correlates the fortunes of individuals and the movement of heavenly bodies. But although the method of correlation in astrology has been used down the centuries in order to cast horoscopes, and is still very widely trusted, scientific thought today has no interest in horoscopes because it finds no reason to believe that the pattern of human lives and the pattern of the starry sky are directly related in any way.

Therefore what we want to know about Tillich's "method of correlation" is the relation he supposes to exist between the terms he is correlating. That this presumed relationship is quite basic can be seen if we consider an instance of correlation between a question and an answer. The question, "Why am I feeling this pain?" can appear in correlation with the answer, "You ate too much for dinner," or in correlation with the answer, "Your enemy is using witchcraft to hurt you." Which answer will in fact be taken to be a correlative of the question depends upon the way in which the causes of pain are conceived. The questioner who assumes a relationship of physical effect to physical cause will not consider that he has been answered at all by an assuming a relationship of physical effect to magical cause, and *vice versa*. Every question, in fact, contains presuppositions limiting the possible answers that can be made to it, and we need to know the context in which the question has been asked if we are to reply intelligently to it. It may very well be that we cannot reply to the question at all until it has been rephrased in order to exclude implications which we are not prepared to admit because they "beg the question."

Thus when Tillich proposes to solve the problem of Christianity and the modern mind (or, in more general terms, the problem of "message" and "situation") by the method of correlating "questions" implied in the situation with "answers" implied in the message, this may sound like an excellent piece of apologetic strategy. To produce Christianity as the answer to the questions asked by the modern mind must surely take the ground from under the feet of the unbeliever who argues that Christianity flourished in ages of ignorance but is outmoded today. Yet it should be realized at the same time that this method, which is meant to preserve the integrity of the Christian message, puts the "answer" under the power of the "question." By using this metaphor of question-and-answer Tillich is indicating that the Christian message will be stated solely in terms demanded by the "question" side of his correlation, and this is surely a big price to pay—perhaps too big a one—for an apologetic vantage ground.

For Tillich does not shrink from stating dogmatically that the Christian "answers" derive their meaning from being answers to a particular sort of question:

> The answers implied in the event of revelation are meaningful only in so far as they are in correlation with questions concerning the whole of our existence, with existential questions.[2]

After this declaration, we are prepared for the full explanation of the method that follows:

> In using the method of correlation, systematic theology proceeds in the following way: it makes an analysis of the human situation out of which the existential questions arise, and it demonstrates that the symbols used in the Christian message are the answers to these questions.[3]

Here the notion of the Christian message being given in symbols requires explanation; but the general procedure is plain enough, although how the procedure is justified is not yet apparent. What we need to know is the frame of reference in which the questions concerning existence are set—those all-important questions whose function is to make intelligible the content of the Christian message. This we need to know, because this alone will tell us the context into which the Gospel is to be placed and thus the limits which will be put to the kind of "answer" that it will be allowed to give.

II

In Tillich's system the relation of "situation" to "message" and of "existential question" to "theological answer" reflects the relationship presumed to exist between philosophy and religious faith. Tillich explains that the analysis of the human situation which theology makes in order to produce existential questions is carried out wholly in philosophical terms. He insists that, in making his analysis, the theologian works strictly as a philosopher and does not introduce any theological elements into his analysis; for although his view-point is inevitably influenced by his convictions he will not, on that account, falsify his philosophic vision.[4] Tillich bases his case for his own particular system of philosophical theology on the fact that all theology must use language and so becomes involved in the thought-forms of a particular age and culture: it cannot exclude "situation".[5] Yet, when all is said, it is difficult to believe that the Christian theologian can state Christian doctrine only when, putting behind him all he believes as a man of faith, he speaks as a philosopher. Granted that no theology can escape the influence of the contemporary climate of thought, it is still far from evident why "situation" should dominate theology to such a degree that it is able to dictate the kind of theological statements that may be made.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 63–64.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 3–7.

Why is the Christian message not allowed to speak unless spoken to, and then only to reply to questions put to it?

This relationship is described in his *Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality*. The synthesis which he there seeks to establish between the two parts of the title of the book is the key to all his thinking. The Christian faith and the philosophic quest belong together; Pascal was wrong, and the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob is one and the same God as the God of the philosophers; the philosopher and the theologian seek the same goal and are sustained by the same resources—this is Tillich's explicit thesis. It is not necessarily the conclusion to which his arguments lead. For while in this book, he speaks in terms of a synthesis which shall do justice to both elements, and thus avoids the mistakes of nineteenth-century "liberal" Protestantism, yet his reasoning actually assumes that Christianity must be fitted into the framework of a speculative system. The core of the argument is as follows:

> The ultimate concern of the believer is concern about that which really is ultimate and therefore the ground of his being and meaning. He implicitly asks the question of ultimate reality. . . . As a believer, he is not concerned with ontological research; but he is concerned with truth, and this means ultimate reality. . . . Faith includes the ontological question, whether the question is asked explicitly or not.[6]

In this passage the presumed relationship which gives rise to the method of correlation is stated directly, although Tillich's metaphor of question-and-answer once more tends to blur the issue. It is plainly asserted that the Christian believer cannot have a faith which is adequate without taking for the object of his faith, at least by implication, that ultimate reality which the philosopher seeks by means of ontological speculation. In other words, truly to know the true God men must go to the metaphysician and learn of him. The touchstone of truth is in his sole possession.

Thus the synthesis between "biblical religion" and "the search for ultimate reality" (ontology) is for Tillich one where the relation between the two cannot be expressed accurately in a simple "and". This relationship is one in which the first-named element of the synthesis cannot stand alone without the second as a background and principle of interpretation.

If we want to know how Tillich can be so sure that Christianity and philosophy belong together in a final unity, we learn that in so believing he feels himself supported by both his philosophical and his theological conscience. As religion and philosophy belong together, so do reason and revelation. Indeed, reason in the soul of men—reason, that is, in the classical sense of *logos* and not mere "reasoning"— represents the principle of meaning in its fullest extent. It is found in intuitions of the heart, in aesthetic judgements, and in commitments of faith as well as in acts of rational knowledge. Theologically, Tillich insists on the absolute necessity for republishing the *logos* theology of the school of Alexandria, with its

6. *Op. cit.*, p. 59.

union of *gnosis* and *episteme*—mystical and conceptual knowledge.[7] Philosophically, he champions the Greek "spiritual" conception of reason as against the modern restriction of reason's task to the finding of means for ends: "The denial of reason in the classical sense is antihuman because it is antidivine."[8]

It now becomes completely evident why biblical religion is not a way to truth until the "ontological question" is asked. The subordination of religious belief to philosophy has its source in Tillich's *logos* doctrine. According to his system, revelation figures as a "self-transcending" or "ecstatic" moment in reason where reason, though transcended, is preserved intact, being grasped from "outside" itself only because it is grasped by *its own* depths.[9] In reason the human and the divine are one, and therefore reason has a more inclusive revelatory function than "revelation," commonly so-called. In practice, it is true, religion and philosophy seem to be rivals suspicious of each other, yet they each aspire to a final unity, a unity of *theonomy* (or rule of the divine law in its fulness), where man's rational nature can be reunited with its deeper, hidden self by reaching beyond appearances to the power of being. And philosophy has this advantage over religious faith: it traffics directly with truth. For truth appears recognizably "for someone, namely, for the mind which in the power of the rational word, the *logos*, grasps the level of reality in which the really real 'dwells.' "[10] The philosopher, striving for truth by means of the cognitive act can, even now, grasp the "really real." The believer knows reality only through the symbols of his faith.

III

Since the correlation of "situation" and "message" turns out to be a reading of the religious "message" wholly in terms of a philosophical analysis of the "situation," Tillich's method cannot be other than a *reduction* of Christian doctrine to make it agree with his ontology. Theology, on this view, becomes a technique of re-interpreting confessional and credal statements so that they can be used to support a theory of the "really real."

This general conclusion is confirmed when we examine Tillich's own account of how the method of correlation works. Here, for example, is Tillich's own presentation of how the nature of God is to be understood:

> In respect to content the Christian answers are dependent on the revelatory events in which they appear; in respect to form they are dependent on the structure of the questions which they answer. God is the answer to the question implied in human finitude. This answer cannot be derived from the analysis of existence. However, if the notion of God appears in systematic correlation with the threat of nonbeing which is implied in existence, God must be called

7. *Systematic Theology* I, pp. 153–154, 157.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 72; cf. 157 n.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 113–114.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 101.

the infinite power of being which resists the threat of nonbeing. In classical theology this is being itself.[11]

God, as the "answer," says Tillich, cannot be derived from the analysis which asks the "question." Yet he declares that being-itself or "the ground of being" is God on the grounds of an analysis of what it means to be finite and to know the difference between existential and essential being. *The question of God*, he says, is the question implied in being, and it is the finitude of being which drives us to the question of God.[12] Thus it seems that God is already in the question, before any answer is given. Again, Tillich claims that the philosophical "questions" give the form of the theological "answers," while their content is derived from religious revelation. But surely to correlate the notion of God with the threat of non-being and discover that He is the infinite power of being to resist non-being is to impart a very definite *content* to the notion of God; and this content derives entirely from the definition of God as being-itself over against the background of finite existence with which being-itself is contrasted.

If, in this example, anything is not clear about the application of the method of correlation it is whether any content at all has been derived from the "answer"—which is, we must remember, an answer provided not directly but by means of symbols. True the word "God" is borrowed from the language of religious faith; but is is an "empty" word, waiting to be given specific content. The theologian using Tillich's method proceeds to give the word content by stating that "God is being-itself or the absolute" and "that he is not God if he is not being-itself." Only here does he speak "directly and properly," and in saying anything beyond this he must speak figuratively and by analogy. Even then, everything he says about God will be *on this basis*, i.e., related ontologically.[13] And, although the truth of the "symbolical" statements of the Christian message is not supposed to be affected by being interpreted by theology, yet these statements are compelled to witness to a God given in ontological speculation. Consequently, they are allowed no more than that measure of meaning which they receive from being placed within the ontological system.

For instance, we are told that the biblical "symbol" of *the Living God* must be understood to mean that "God lives in so far as he is the ground of life." This symbol is one of those "provided by the ontological elements" found in the system, so that, because these elements have a polar character, the symbols must reflect this character, and the symbol representing the "dynamic" pole must be balanced against a symbol representing the pole of "form." The symbol of *the Living God* must be corrected by a symbol indicating God's perfection and self-preservation. Why? By reason of the fact that although tension between dynamics and form (potentiality and actuality) is characteristic of existence it is transcended in being-itself, together with the polarity we find in all the ontological elements as known

11. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 239.

in existence. "The polar character of the ontological elements is rooted in the divine life, but the divine life is not subject to this polarity."[14] It cannot be overlooked that the final result is to make the Biblical message that God is the Living God wholly subservient to a theory of being-itself and the elements of being.

The Christian message appears in symbols because Tillich's Absolute,[15] being-itself, cannot be described without recourse to symbolic language. We may say that the Absolute *is*, but to say more defeats the ordinary limits of speech and thought. The system needs revelation as well as reason. It needs answers to supplement its questions. But this does not mean that either "revelation" or "answer" has any independent status apart from "reason" or "question": these are called in to give additional support to the system, much as Plato makes use of myths to round out his philosophy. And the method of correlation assumes that (theologically speaking) revelation has no function but to serve reason in its ontological task, and that the Christian faith exists in order to support, in symbolic form, the analysis of existence made by ontology. For, just as in connection with the method of correlation the really important thing is the presumed relationship believed to justify the possibility of correlation, so the really important thing about the claim that the Christian message operates by means of symbols is the presumed supra-symbolic reality believed to be indicated by the symbols. In other words, before querying whether the Christian message is given in symbols or not, we ought to ask: granted the message comes in symbols, what are these symbols *symbols of*? In Tillich's system Christian symbolic language is taken to be symbolic of philosophical truth which cannot be expressed in the language of conceptual thought, and, when it is expressed, appears as the conclusion of "ecstatic reason."

Now the system demands that the philospher must "believe" in order to know. That means he must be a theologian, as well as a philosopher, in order to carry out the philosophic task thoroughly. But the belief of the philosopher-theologian is actually laid down by his philosophy. Though as a religious man he may worship God, as a philosopher he knows that no God other than being-itself is worthy to become his ultimate concern. Though as a religious man he may have faith, as a philosopher he knows that the only adequate faith is participation in the power of being-itself through the knowledge that being-itself is the infinite power of being which resists the threat of non-being. Certainly, without the mediation of religious symbols he would not know the meaning of faith, by experiencing the meaning of being *for him*; but on the other hand, the end of his search is the state of "absolute faith," where religious symbols are transcended as far as is possible under the conditions of existence, so that nothing "concrete"

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 242–244.

15. Tillich dislikes the term *the Absolute*, as he dislikes the term *metaphysics*, because of the connotations it has acquired. (See *Systematic Theology*, I, p. 12, and *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, p. 340.) But since he himself uses it ("God is being-itself or the absolute," *Systematic Theology* I, p. 239), there seems no good reason for not preferring it in this connection to the name *God*, which has such strong religious associations.

continues to mediate between the existing self and the power of being which prevents the self from being overwhelmed by non-being.[16]

This conclusion is not surprising. If the symbols of the Christian message have meaning only in correlation with existential questions, then, whatever answers these symbols may give, they possess no meaning in themselves. It is existence by itself, and nothing else, which ultimately can answer its own question; for no answer from "outside" is permissible, according to Tillich's stand on "ecstatic naturalism." If the manifestation of the divine can be received only in the light of man's existential situation, then no message can be received unless it speaks of the divinity immanent in that situation. To choose the method of correlation is to declare that the Christian God must fit into the framework which is discovered by analysing existence, and that He is one with the ultimate reality whose nature is declared in the relation of the human self to its world.

IV

There is one relevant matter, however, which has not yet been considered. Sometimes Tillich appears to suggest that the theological "answer" does not stand under the power of the philosophical question:

> Symbolically speaking, God answers man's questions, and under the impact of God's answers man asks them. . . . This is a circle which drives man to a point where question and answer are not separated.[17]

At first glance this statement might seem to be about the way of working of Tillich's theological method. But of course it is not a statement about method at all and does not in the least affect the entire independence of the philosophical analysis required by the method. It is a statement about the nature of that ultimate reality which Tillich assumes to underlie and justify his method. He goes on to say that the point where question and answer meet is not a point in time but one belonging "to man's essential being, to the unity of his finitude with the infinity in which he was created and from which he is separated."

So when Tillich describes "question" and "answer" as forming a unity he is referring to the *logos* philosophy upon which his system is founded, the philosophy which teaches how man can ask questions about the infinite because he is both essentially one with the infinite and also existentially separated from it. This philosophy includes the faith that philosophy and theology are *essentially* one. But they are *existentially* separated, and so at present the Christian revelation can have meaning only in the light of an existential analysis. Tillich says that there is a point where question and answer are not separated, because of his belief that reason is both human and divine. He believes in the potential divinity in man enabling him to rise above the limitations of finite existence, in which he lives as an exile, to the infinite which is his real home.

16. *The Courage to Be*, pp. 176–180.
17. *Systematic Theology* I, p. 61.

Tillich's "ecstatic naturalism" is a faith in man's innate self-transcendence as the fount of revelation. It is no part of the present analysis to show how this basically Platonic faith in the power of *eros* to transcend existence conflicts with traditional Christian doctrine. But the nature of the faith is not in doubt, being evident not only in the positive assertions of Tillich's system but also in the way Biblical terminology is continually by-passed there for other terms more congenial to his faith. Thus in Tillich's system the Hegelian term *estrangement* stands in place of *sin*, because estrangement is "conquered" by *eros*, i.e., "love as the striving for the reunion of the separated"[18]—a view attributed to Paul, yet more obviously derived from the *Symposium*; and the central paradox of the Christian message is declared to be not incarnation, redemption or justification, but the New Being: "the appearance of that which conquers existence under the conditions of existence."[19] "Question" and "answer", therefore, are not separated *at the point where it is assumed that the Christian message really means awareness of participation in the power which conquers existential estrangement*, the New Being the reality of which cannot be doubted but the historical embodiment of which might (or might not) have been Jesus.[20] And in order to come to this point it is obviously necessary to accept, as the indispensable starting-point, not man's encounter with God in Christ but the "ontological shock" which makes man aware of the divine in himself. There is no other way into Tillich's "circle."

Tillich claims that the method of correlation has always been used, consciously or unconsciously, by systematic theologians, and he brings in as a witness the opening sentences of Calvin's *Institutes* concerning man's misery and God's glory. [21] But the quotation he gives includes the words, "on the other hand, it is plain that no man can arrive at the true knowledge of himself, without having first contemplated the divine character, and then descended to the consideration of his own." This is quite a different "circle" from the one in which Tillich operates, for it founds its analysis of the human situation upon the Christian revelation of God—in this way putting the "question" under the power of the "answer." The "answers implied in divine self-manifestation" here "guide" the questions implied in human existence instead of being "guided" by them.

"The method of correlation explains the contents of the Christian faith through existential questions and theological answers in mutual interdependence,"[22]—so runs Tillich's claim. In practice his existential analysis is developed into a self-sufficient ontological system. And to this system the Christian message, symbolically understood, is then accommodated. The latter stands to the former in a relation of complete dependence.

18. *Systematic Theology* II, p. 47. Cf. *Love, Power and Justice*, p. 25.
19. *Systematic Theology* I, p. 57; "Essential God-Manhood has appeared within existence and subjected itself to the conditions of existence without being conquered by them." *Systematic Theology* II, p. 98.
20. *Systematic Theology* II, p. 114.
21. *Systematic Theology* I, p. 63 and n.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

The Essential Oneness of Christ's Body: "A Still More Excellent Way"

WILLIAM C. MacVEAN

PROFESSOR FENNELL in his article, "The Essential Oneness of Christ's Body" (*C.J.T.*, Vol. IV, No. 1), has attempted to show wherein lies the oneness of the Church, and has tried to combine what one writer has described as the "organic" and the "contractual"[1] ideas of the Church in a synthesis which he hopes will supply some sort of answer to the modern ecumenical problem. The aim certainly is worthy, but this writer doubts that it can be achieved on the proposed basis.

It would have been useful if Mr. Fennell had given us some definition of terms. For example, what exactly does he mean by "necessary"; "essential"; "constitutive"? We will endeavour to show what they mean to us as we go along, but a certain ambivalence in Mr. Fennell's attitude towards the Church as "given" and "gathered" shows itself in a confusion of these terms which renders them mutually contradictory. Another problem raised by this ambivalence, and in our opinion not satisfactorily met, is the distinction between two aspects of the life of the Church, namely, its "union" and its "unity." Unity derives from union, and not vice versa.

The difficulties of Mr. Fennell's position become more apparent when he tries to deal with the subject of his article. The bases of the essential oneness he finds in expressions of oneness rather than in oneness itself, and for this reason he is compelled to deal with the Church as visible only. Thus in the Church he finds: (i) a unity of origin arising out of God's creative act in bringing the Church into being; (ii) a social unity which is the expression of the shared divine life of the members of the Church; (iii) a unity of temper and life which itself arises out of "a common aim and loyalty and the pursuit of a common task."

It is somewhat surprising therefore to discover later on that this unity is not essential, for we are told that the essential unity of the Church does *not* lie in the fact that the Church is made up of those who have a common belief, or a common aim and purpose. No doubt Christians frequently disagree as to what should be the common belief or common ethical standard, and perhaps what is common to Christians in these respects in any age may not always be what our Lord enjoined, but right belief and right conduct are essential to the unity of the Church, even though we do not believe that they create the essential oneness of the Church.

Among the factors which do not express the essential unity of the Church, Mr. Fennell lists the institutional form of the Church. We have the right

1. F. W. Dillistone, *The Structure of the Divine Society*, p. 232 ff.

to ask whether the Church can be recognized, whether it has a recognizable form, and if so, what that form is. If the Church has no form, it is doubtful that mere humans can recognize a Church at all. Since believing and acting in certain ways are already precluded from belonging to the essential unity of the Church, it is doubtful that we can even speak of the Church.

It is our contention that the Scriptural evidence and the evidence of the the life of the Church through the ages require us to accept the Church as a body which has a particular form, and that that form is given so that we will know the Church. We maintain also that the body as a living creation has been given its own characteristic modes of expression which specify it as this particular body in action. Among these we may list order, doctrine and sacraments, the rejection of which results at the very least in abnormality. If we deny that these are necessary to the recognition of the Church in the world, we assert in effect that the Church is unknowable, since we are left without any criterion.

Certain questions are raised by our contentions in the light of what Professor Fennell has written concerning the essential oneness of Christ's body. What is the Church? What are its nature and form? How are its nature and form expressed in the world?

I

What Professor Fennell is attempting to do in his article is to state "what one believes to be the essential nature of the Church as found in the scriptural witness to revelation," and from the many illustrations he has selected St. Paul's description, "the body of Christ." The writer describes this illustration as a metaphor, but St. Paul does not limit himself to a mere figure of speech. He introduces his illustration in a long descriptive simile which begins: "For as the body is one, and hath many members . . . so also is Christ" (I Cor. 12:12). Then having explained what he means, Paul sums up: "Now ye are the body of Christ, and members in particular" (I Cor. 12:27).

From St. Paul's description we obtain certain suggestions as to the nature of the Church. Since it is a body, it has a certain form. Its members have certain duties, and presumably have to perform them in a certain way. There is also order in the body. This would perhaps naturally follow if there is a body at all, but Paul goes to make this clear: "And God hath set some in the Church, first apostles, secondarily prophets, thirdly teachers. . . ." (I Cor. 12:28).

It would appear that the Church is "the visible part of Christ, that part of Himself through which he now necessarily acts.[2] We might illustrate this from Paul's own conversion experience. There we are told that in his vision he heard a voice which said: "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?" The owner of the voice identified himself as Jesus. But Paul had never persecuted Jesus, and was not doing so at that time. He was, however,

2. S. C. Carpenter, *Christianity According to St. Luke*, p. 56.

persecuting the Church, so that to persecute the Church must be the same as to persecute Christ himself. If that is so, we must of necessity consider how we can be in Christ; for if the Church is the body of Christ, the life of the Church must be the life of Christ, and the essential nature of the Church must be the essential nature of Christ.

There are, of course, other descriptions of the Church in the New Testament. It is the "vine and the branches" (St. John 15), the "sheepfold" (St. John 10), "a building of God" (II Cor. 5:1), and so on. Now even if we allow that these are all metaphors—although we see no compelling reason why description of the Church should require this figure of speech—we can at least draw some conclusions from the type of metaphor used. In each case the Church is a union achieved, not by the activity or desire of the members, but by a character or condition given. It is a union entered by incorporation, by grafting, and the active agent is God himself. The Gospel goes further and makes it clear that Baptism is the means of incorporation into the Church. "Except a man be born of water and of the spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God" (St. John 3:5). This is the act of incorporation, which not only witnesses to our decision, but also grants what we desire. Only then are we "in Christ," "new creatures" (II Cor. 5:17).

This appears to be what Professor Fennell is saying in his first section, although it is surprising that no mention is made of the means whereby we come to share in the oneness of Christ's body. This omission may have arisen from a desire to avoid a reference to sacraments as beyond the particular concern of the article, but an attempt to describe "the essential nature of the Church as found in the scriptural witness to revelation" cannot avoid the sacramental if it is to be true to its terms of reference. Besides, if Christ is "God's primary community-creating gift to men," we must surely be able to see this community, and there must be some way of entering it.

It is possible to agree that "Where Christ is . . . there is the Church"; this has been the doctrine of the Church from the beginning. But we believe that it is not only safer, but also true, to say that this power belongs to the Church simply because Christ is where the Church is, and we believe that the Church was made visible so that we would know where Christ is. We are also warned in Scripture not to believe "if any man" says to us, "lo, here is Christ, or there" (St. Matthew 24:23).

God met man's need by making himself visible in his supreme revelation of himself in the Incarnation, and this need of man is not less evident with respect to the Church. To say that "it is *community* which is the reality of our common life" is to say nothing at all about the essential oneness of the Church, because community is the expression of our oneness, not our oneness itself. This raises the question of priorities, the difference between "union" and "unity."

Union is the condition of the life in Christ which is shared by all those who are members of the Church, that is to say, of those who are incorpo-

rated into the body of Christ. Christ's body is forever an integrated whole, which is neither increased nor diminished in its wholeness by the addition of members or by the refusal of people to accept incorporation. Union is the objective state of the Church, so that even when we are totally unconscious of other people as members of the Church, our union with them still exists.

Unity on the other hand is the expression here in the world of the union we have in the body of Christ. It is expressed in many different ways, so that time and space are not necessarily deterrents to unity. But because unity is in large measure subjective, it is open to the liabilities of sin—to the insistence upon personal opinion, the refusal to accept doctrine, order and discipline, or even the neglect of prayer and of those acts of charity which are in many cases the only way in which our unity can be expressed.

II

In what then does the essential oneness of the Church consist? It consists in our union with Christ. It was for this that Jesus prayed "that they all may be one; as thou Father art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us" (St. John 17:21). Presumably St. Paul meant the same thing when he wrote to the Romans: "So we, being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another" (Romans 12:5).

The union we have in Christ must be a union of personal being. The characteristic which separates humanity from other created things is personality, by which man is conscious not only of himself, but also of other persons and of his relation to them. This characteristic man has received from the Creator who himself is Personal Being, and who created man "in his own image." Our being therefore must be similar to the being of God, even though derivative. Man from the beginning stood in a special relationship to God, a relationship both essential and moral, so that he could speak of God as Father, and see God's purpose for himself as sonship.

It was to restore this image, which contained the similitude of sonship, that the eternal Son took manhood in the Incarnation. Our derivative sonship was thus taken into the generated Sonship of Christ, and was offered by the Son to the Father, once for all in the flesh, but eternally in the spirit. The various acts of the earthly life of Christ were the historical facets of the single eternal act of redemption by which man was made fit again for the life with God for which he was created, and as we share the personal being of the historical manhood of Christ, so also we can share the personal being of the redeemed and glorified manhood of Christ.

The meaning of Christmas does not seem so difficult for people to understand as the meaning of Easter and the Ascension. For God to come into the world seems possible; that a man should rise from the dead and ascend into heaven is not so easy to accept. But we must assert that the manhood of Christ, which he took in the Incarnation, went into the tomb and also came out of the grave on the first Easter. That same manhood, now glorified, ascended into heaven and there eternally intercedes for us. The

Ascension of Christ did not signify the end of the humanity of Christ any more than our death signifies the end of our humanity. "The heavens have prepared a throne, the clouds His Ascension. *The Angels marvel, beholding a man exalted over them.* The Father awaiteth Him, Whom as co-eternal He hath in His bosom."[3] Stephen, when he was being stoned, saw "Jesus standing at the right hand of God" (Acts 7:55). It was as a man that he recognized him.

It is into the glorified manhood of Christ that we are incorporated, not merely by our acceptance of the mighty acts of God in Christ, not simply by an intellectual assent to any creed or statement of belief, but by the acceptance of God's Grace in a sacramental act appointed for this purpose, namely Baptism. It is then that we become *new* creatures, *filii in Filio.* And it is because we are so incorporated that we become essentially one in the Church.

In the second section of his article, Professor Fennell represents the essential nature of the Body of Christ as (i) "a community of persons united to one another through their sharing of a common faith in Him and the love which His spirit quickens in their hearts," and (ii) "*Koinonia*—a fellowship of personal beings called out of self-isolation into communion with God and their fellows, genuine corporeity as over against perverse individualism."

It is difficult to tell what is meant by "a common faith." Presumably, acceptance of a common creed is not meant, because elsewhere the writer states that the essential unity of the Church does not lie "in a body of doctrinal beliefs or even of creedal confessions of faith." But the act of faith is personal to each individual. It is an experience which in itself cannot be shared with anyone else except by expression of some sort, creedal or otherwise. The faith could hardly be made common in any other way.

Similarly, *Koinonia* is the *expression* of the essential life of the Church: it is not that life itself. Through their fellowship the members of the Body express the new life that is in them. If priorities can be assigned, then both the sharing of a common faith and fellowship must be secondary to being, and are therefore on the same level as worship-forms, doctrine, creed and ministry. The very Scriptures are in this sense secondary, because they express the meaning for various people of the revelation of God in Christ.

No one doubts that many people in all parts of the Church on earth, and in other groups of Christian people, have made a response to the revelation of God in Christ, and if this were sufficient, then the fellowship of all these people would be assured. But apart from those who do not think that incorporation into Christ is necessary, there remains the fact that those who are in Christ have not yet realized the full sanctification of Christ. They are in the process of becoming *de facto* what they already are *de jure,* and sin frequently prevents the unity we so ardently desire.

3. Orthodox Church Office for Ascension Day; cf. Ps. 8:5; Hebr. 2:7, 9.

III

We still have to notice some of those things which Professor Fennell says are secondary but not unnecessary. Even if we accepted "community" and "*Koinonia*" as descriptive of the essential nature of the Church we should expect them to have some concrete structural form and expression in the world. If we went further and really accepted the Church as a body we should expect it to have some of the characteristics of all natural bodies, for the Church is not a collection of individual particles held together by some external force, but the "Body of Christ," the union of all those who are incorporated into the living Son of God. It is therefore the continuing incarnate life of Jesus who is *a* man.

To speak of things as secondary but not unnecessary is to make a distinction between the essential and the necessary so nice as to be inconceivable. Can a body be a body without a form into which the parts are organized, and is this form essential to the existence of the body? Or again, if a body lives will it not act in a manner consistent with its particular nature as a body? If, as Professor Fennell says, "The Church is the creation of God," are we to suppose that in this one instance God created something which has no form or order or distinctive mode of action?

We are told for example, that "Church order cannot be regarded as of the essence" of the Church, and that it cannot become "an article of faith." Ministry itself is of the essence of the Church because it is a characteristic of the life of Christ, and therefore of the life of the Church. *The* ministry is indeed "God's gift to the Church," but we have never heard of a gift of God which either did not have a characteristic order of its own, or did not produce effects of a particular order. If the ministry "has been called into being by God in Christ," we may be sure that the being into which it has been called will have a certain order. As far as we can discover, the Church never thought otherwise.

When Mr. Fennell writes that "it (ministerial order) serves to constitute Christ's Body, but it is not itself the constitutive element," one wonders just what he means. A body is usually made up of several constitutive elements, many of which are rather more than of the *bene esse* of the body. If the ministry serves to constitute Christ's Body, it is certainly *a* constitutive element, and no body can be said to exist, or at least to exist in its fulness, if it lacks any of its constitutive elements.

If, as Professor J. K. S. Reid says, "The biblical record concerning the ministry leads . . . to ambiguous conclusions,"[4] this does not of itself dispose of the apostolic ministry as it existed, and still exists, in the Church Catholic. What is more important is that by the time the Church had decided what was Catholic Scripture, it had also been operating for some time under what we would call the Catholic Ministry. And just as there was some

4. J. K. S. Reid, *The Biblical Doctrine of the Ministry*, Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional Paper, No. 4 (1955), p. 30.

doubt in the early days as to what should constitute Scripture, so also we may expect to find some confusion in the language used concerning the ministry. We are not, however, among those who find the Scriptures so very obscure and ambiguous concerning the ministry, nor can we see why it should be supposed that the early Church was so unaware that it should "submit everywhere, without a single surviving protest, to the imposition of novel claims to authority by ambitious individuals."[5]

Certainly the ministry of the Church is functional, because ministry is the function of the body. The body is made so that it can perform its functions, and it has the parts in their proper order in its form necessary to those functions. If the ministry is "necessary for the perpetuation and edification of the Church," in what way can that ministry which the Church has always considered essential be said to be only of the *bene esse* of the Church?

The functions of the ministry belong to the Church because it is the body of Christ, but no created body either prescribes its own functions or decides what part of itself will carry any particular function. The New Testament evidence is that Jesus chose the Apostles and commissioned them. There is sufficient evidence also that the Apostles exercised *episcopē* in the Church, and that they felt able to pass this ministry on. The Church also continued the apostolic practice of granting to certain men *episcopē*, which has meant in all ages at least the right and the power to hand the ministry on to those who are called, and who have convinced the Church that they are called, to the ministry.

There is only one ministry to which God can call a man, and that is to the ministry of the Church which is God's ministry. But not everyone who is called to the ministry fully realizes his call, because many do not recognize the Church, take no part in its life, and are therefore not known by those whose business it is to "try the spirits, whether they are of God" (I John 4:1).

Those of us who "cherish a ministry in apostolic succession" and "make it a *sine qua non* of the Church" are bound to do so because we see in it the given order of the Body. "Let all respect the deacons as representing Jesus Christ, the Bishops as a type of the Father, and the presbyters as God's high council and the Apostolic College. Apart from these no Church deserves the name."[6] It is necessary to contend that ministerial order, while not *the* primary element which constitutes the Church, is nevertheless *a* constitutive element. It is even more important today to insist that the ministry is only *one* of the necessary elements because of the tendency in discussions on the subject of unity to put the apostolic ministry on trial, as if, were it found guilty of insufficient biblical evidence, or too sufficient rejection by reformed Christian groups, the whole Catholic idea of the Church would stand condemned.

5. R. T. Halliday, "The Doctrine of The Ministry," *Church Quarterly Review*, 1958, p. 16.
6. Ignatius of Antioch, *To The Trallians*, 3.

We come now to the last matter on which we wish to offer some comment —the Eucharist. There is no evidence either from scripture or from the life of the Church that the Eucharist was ever a means to unity. It has always been the chief act of worship of the Church re-presenting the sacrifice of Calvary in the offering by the Body of itself to God through Jesus Christ. "If ye then are the body and members of Christ, the mystery of yourselves is laid upon the table of the Lord, the mystery of yourselves ye receive."[7]

What Professor Fennell is interested in is the separation between Christians at the Lord's Table. He writes: "If the Church of Christ is as we have understood it to be, we fail to discern the Body whenever we refuse to act upon the truth that all who believe in and love the Lord Jesus Christ are essentially one in Him and exclude from fellowship at His table fellow-members of the *ecclesia* of God." We have already shown that we cannot accept "all who believe in and love the Lord Jesus Christ" as an adequate description of the Church. Separation at the Lord's Table arises from the same causes which prevent fellowship at other levels.

Even the modern practice known as intercommunion—the word itself almost defeats the object it seeks to promote—emphasizes the disunity of the people who take part. Acts of intercommunion are special occasions: not the result of natural activity by the Church. They require special invitations to people, who do not normally consider themselves one, to act in this particular instance as if they were not divided. In some cases intercommunion may require a formal act of schism on the part of the person participating, because the Church, to which he believes he belongs, does not allow those who are not of the Church to assist at the Eucharist. And after what is called communion they go their own ways not actually united, and without any greater sense of unity. Whatever this may be, it is not the offering of the Eucharist.

It is the Church—made up of those who are in Christ by incorporation, by acceptance of sound doctrine, by fellowship and communion with the Bishop—that is able to offer the Eucharist. For the Eucharist to be an effective act of union and unity in the Church, it is necessary that the constituted unity of the Church should be present not only at, but also in, the offering. It is simply this which is lacking among groups of Christians. "Shall two walk together except they have agreed?" (Amos 3:3). Can people who are in fact disunited make the offering of unity and eat the Bread of Unity?

IV

The search for unity will be hard and long, and while we would be unfaithful to our profession of faith if we left any stone unturned in our efforts to effect unity, nevertheless we believe that the way of unity is set for us. Our oneness can only be in Christ as he is in the Father.

7. Augustine of Hippo, *Tr. in Joan*, xxvi, 17.

This essential oneness will be shown in the world by unity of faith, doctrine, practice and order among those who are in Christ. James was not wrong when he said that "Faith without works is dead" (James 2:20), nor did he limit himself to works of charity. He saw quite clearly that a verbal profession of faith could be made comprehensible to others only by a total acceptance of and commitment to the requirements of the faith professed.

We believe that when all Christians reach this state we shall have come to the condition mentioned by the writer to the Ephesians; we shall have come to the "unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God" which will finally bring us "unto a perfect man" (Ephesians 4).

The Origins of the Separate School Question in Ontario

JOHN S. MOIR

UNLIKE other historical problems of church-state relations in Canada, the separate school question remains to this day a very live issue. The report of the Hope Commission, an Ontario Royal Commission on education which reported in 1950, contained both an historical summary of the separate school controversy and a well documented refutation in the form of a dissenting minority report by the Roman Catholic members of the Commission. Apparently the Canadian tradition of compromise has not been completely successful in this particular field. This paper is a brief attempt to appraise the origins of the problem in what is now the Province of Ontario.

I. "Protection from Insult"

The cases for separate schools in Ontario and Quebec constitute the obverse and reverse of the same coin rather than parallel situations. In Quebec the school system is and was religious, a heritage of New France; in Ontario common schools are undenominational, and the existence of separate schools is an exception to the doctrine of popular sovereignty stemming from political and social conditions which arose under the Act of Union of 1841. In that year the Roman Catholic Church's control of all phases of the education of its adherents in Lower Canada was complete and unquestioned. Protestant schools did exist there, but system there was none. In Upper Canada successive attempts at legislation had failed to provide satisfactory school facilities, and the most recent common school bill had been vetoed by the Legislative Council in 1836 on the ground that the province was already overburdened with taxes for macadamized roads, courthouses and jails.[1] Traditionally the Church of England had exercised a prevailing, and to many minds, undesirable influence over elementary education in the upper province.

In his Speech from the Throne in 1841 to the first session of the first Parliament of the United Canadas, Governor General Lord Sydenham reminded the members that " a due provision for the Education of the People" was a prime duty of the state.[2] But realizing the potential difficulties of imposing a national system of primary education on the two distinct cultures Sydenham suggested that "steps may be taken, by which an advance

1. J. G. Hodgins, ed., *Documentary History of Education in Upper Canada*, 28 v., (Toronto, 1894–1910), III, p. 124. Hereafter cited as *DHE*.
2. *Ibid.*, IV, p. 4.

to a more perfect system may be made." Before the school bill could be introduced petitions began to arrive from congregations of the Churches of England and Scotland praying that the Bible be made a prescribed textbook for all schools receiving government financial aid. In the Legislative Council William Morris, lay spokesman of the Kirk, warned that if Roman Catholics found this provision objectionable, "we must part in peace, and conduct the education of the respective Bodies according to our sense of what is right."[3]

The Common School Bill of 1841 was described by Solicitor General Day when introducing it as only part of "the great general system of National Education."[4] Originally the Bill contained no mention of separate schools of any description, thus clearly anticipating a unified national system of secular elementary education. But opposition soon made itself felt. The Roman Catholic bishops of Kingston and Quebec objected to the principles of the Bill. John Strachan, Bishop of Toronto, petitioned strongly that the education of Anglican children should be entrusted to Anglican teachers only. The result of this flood of petitions, forty-two in all, was that clauses were added to the Bill permitting any religious minority to establish dissentient schools.

Thus, while the Act ostensibly created a unitary system of elementary education for the United Provinces, it recognized the existence of Protestant dissentient schools in Lower Canada and provided equal opportunities for religious minorities in Upper Canada. The Act elicited no strong opposition but in practice it proved well-nigh impossible to administer. The attempt to obtain a uniform system in both parts of Canada was abandoned, and the principle of federation which was growing within the Union was also tacitly adopted for the field of elementary education. In 1843 two bills were introduced establishing a new system of elementary schools for Upper Canada alone.

The new plan provided that ten or more freeholders, Protestant or Roman Catholic, might establish a separate school only if the common school teacher belonged to the other major body of Christians. This was a radical departure from the limitless provisions of the Act of 1841. As a safeguard of consciences, however, the Bill added that no child need read any book or join in any devotional exercises objectionable to the parents. Only three of the seventy-one clauses of the Bill dealt with the religious question, but their restrictive nature marked a new and reactionary policy. The sole opposition to the Bill's passage came from Bishop Strachan who vainly requested a denominational division of all Common School funds.

The appointment of Egerton Ryerson as Superintendent of Education in 1844 was probably the most important single event in the educational history of Ontario. Ryerson intended that the educational system should

3. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

He accepted the safeguards of the Common School Act, though convinced be "Provincial, or National" (the terms were synonymous), and based on "the Christianity of the Bible—regardless of the peculiarities of Sects, or Parties." The principles of Christianity could be effected, he believed, without compromising the principles of any group. In his Report of a System of Public Elementary Education he asserted that education must be universal and practical, and therefore established on "Religion and Morality."

> By Religion and Morality I do not mean sectarianism in any form, but the general system of truth and morals taught in the Holy Scriptures. Sectarianism is not morality. . . . Such sectarian teaching may, as it has done, raise up an army of pugilists and persecutors, but it is not the way to create a community of Christians.[5]

that mixed schools could be satisfactory to all. Clearly Ryerson conceived of separate schools as the exceptional means of protecting religious minority rights within the unitary whole of the provincial system. Judging by past events, he had no reason to think the system would develop on other lines than those he had laid out.

Ryerson drafted a remedial school bill in 1846 for his national system, without altering the existing separate school arrangements. One Anglican legislator requested for his denomination the same rights as the Roman Catholics, but otherwise the bill passed through the Provincial Parliament without any reference to the separate school question. The next step was the creation of a provincial Board of Education. Here Ryerson bowed to the advice of Anglican Premier William Henry Draper in avoiding a purely clerical Board. Strachan refused to be a member because this would only encourage opposition to the Board, but he gave his full support to the appointment of Michael Power, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Toronto, who was elected first chairman of the Board.

The lamentable death of Bishop Power from emigrant fever in October, 1847, eventually proved disastrous to Ryerson's plans. All evidence attests that Power had acted with other members of the Board in the friendliest and most harmonious manner. Power's successor, Armand François de Charbonnel, a French count and an ultramontanist who had seen the torch of revolution inflame Europe and shared Pius IX's reaction against the new liberalism, was to prove himself in time a man of a different stamp to that of Power, who had shared Ryerson's view that separate schools were not an essential on principle, although circumstances in this case made them necessary. Even de Charbonnel, for more than a year after his appointment, contended himself with referring to their existence as a "protection from insult."[6]

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 232, 236–243, 249–262.
6. J. G. Hodgins, *Legislation and History of Separate Schools in Upper Canada, 1841–1876*, (Toronto, 1897), p. 30.

The Common School Act of 1846 functioned reasonably well for more than two years. Bishop Strachan was, of course, still opposed on principle to mixed schools, insisting that, "he preferred *separate* Schools, *if they could get them.*"[7] But within the Church of England opposition to Strachan's plans was increasing among Low Church groups (who were largely Irish), and the outbreak of the Papal Aggression issue in 1850 accentuated this internal conflict. It is noteworthy that the aims and claims of the Anglican Bishop of Toronto were the same as those put forward by his Roman Catholic counterpart a few years later. In 1849, however, the passing of Robert Baldwin's Municipal Corporations Act necessitated a revision of the Common Schools Act. Malcolm Cameron, radical member of the second Baldwin-Lafontaine administration, introduced a bill for what he described as "a systematic code" of Common School legislation.[8]

Cameron's bill bore directly on the religious question at two points. It excluded the clergy as visitors to the common schools, and it destroyed the separate schools simply by failing to mention them. Ryerson hastened to protest the first point; he did not protest the second. In point of fact, separate schools of all kinds—Roman Catholic, Protestant, and even the few coloured ones—were declining in number and there was every reason to expect the trend to continue. But Cameron's bill destroyed Ryerson's great plan for a provincial system of elementary education, and, more important, it did away with Ryerson's position. It was well known that Cameron was but one of several enemies of Ryerson within the Reform Government, yet the results of this incident must have surprised all parties concerned.

First, despite Ryerson's protest and a government promise that the bill would be altered, it was passed as introduced. The surprised Superintendent immediately offered his resignation. At once the Government reconsidered its action. Ryerson was asked to remain at his post, Malcolm Cameron resigned from the Cabinet, and the existence of the law itself was ignored by all until another Act could be passed at the next Session as part of Ryerson's price for withdrawing his resignation.

The promised Common School Bill was introduced in 1850 by Ryerson's very co-operative acquaintance, Inspector General Francis Hincks. Forty-eight of the forty-nine clauses passed substantially without change, but on Clause Nineteen, which vested in the municipal authorities of each township the power to establish separate schools Hincks and Ryerson were forced to accept an effective amendment. Roman Catholics were dissatisfied with this circumscription of rural separate schools, and the Vicar General at Kingston and the Administrator of the Toronto Diocese petitioned that "the Catholics of Canada West (may be enabled) to establish separate schools, wherever they may deem it expedient. . . ."[9]

7. Ontario Archives, Hodgins Papers, E. Ryerson to W. H. Draper, March 29, 1847.
8. *DHE*, VIII, p. 142.
9. *Ibid.*, IX, p. 11.

Here was an opportunity in the eyes of High Anglicans to obtain separate Anglican schools by co-operating with the Roman Catholics. Accordingly, an agreement for joint action was reached by Assembly members of each of these churches. But the Ministry learned of the plot and turned the occasion to the best advantage by offering the Roman Catholics the arrangement of 1843, a compromise which met their demands.[10] The Anglicans who had promoted the plan of united action were boasting of a majority of fourteen to twenty votes when the division was called. To their bewilderment and the amusement of the House, the Roman Catholic members voted with the Government.

Hincks admitted that he had only accepted this compromise in deference to the "strong feeling" of his colleagues,[11] and outside of Parliament there was some mild opposition to the "peculiar privileges" granted Roman Catholics at the cost of denominational equality. "The principle thus admitted," remarked George Brown's *Globe*, "strikes at the root of our whole system of national education."[12] If one denomination was entitled to such preferential treatment, then all were. This compromise, the *Globe* added prophetically, might prove to be the thin edge of the wedge. Ryerson, however, stated publicly that there was "no probability that Separate Schools will be more injurious in time to come than they have been in the past."[13] Separate school supporters still paid the local common school rates, and could obtain no government aid beyond the share of the School Grant provided for the teacher's salary on the basis of the school's enrolment.

Thus, with the exception of the concession made by Hincks' Common Schools Act of 1850, the policy towards separate schools since 1841 had been increasingly restrictive. And as yet the only protest of consequence and continuance had come from the Church of England. But the tide of opinion was turning as the first half of the century came to an end. Pius IX had just re-established the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Britain. He had also appointed de Charbonnel to the See of Toronto. The two incidents were pregnant with a fire not celestial which was soon to fall upon Canada with unforeseen and cataclysmic results.

As the plans of the Roman Church Militant unfolded in Britain, George Brown took up the fiery cross of "Papal Aggression" on a dare, and his provocative writing soon divided the province into two hostile camps, Protestant *versus* Catholic. In France de Charbonnel had seen the same trends towards infidelity and indifferentism which in Italy had destroyed the early liberal proclivities of Pius IX. Yet de Charbonnel had already laboured in Canada for several years and his elevation to the bishopric was viewed without suspicion by Canadians, so that when he joined the Board of Educa-

10. Twelve resident heads of Roman Catholic families were now required instead of ten as formerly to establish a separate school where the common school teacher was a Protestant.
11. *Globe*, July 9, 1850.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *DHE*, IX, p. 208.

tion in Power's stead there was no expectation that his policy would be less co-operative than that of Bishop Power. Against this background the first blow which fell on the wedge for separate schools seemed at the moment relatively unimportant.

Toronto's size had been greatly expanded by recent immigration, particularly of Irish Roman Catholics, and the establishment of another separate school was requested by certain Roman Catholics.[14] The request was rejected by the Board of School Trustees as not permitted by the letter of the Act of 1850, which had been so carelessly worded as to permit the setting up of only one separate school in a town or city. The Board's decision was upheld by the Attorney General and the Queen's Bench on appeal. Nevertheless the demand was a reasonable one. Ryerson, absent in Europe at the moment, conceded that remedial legislation must be introduced. At the same time Strachan renewed his attacks on the "intolerable degradation" of a school system which was turning Anglican children into "infidels."[15] Anglicans must have the same privileges as Roman Catholics he insisted, and spurred his flock to petition Parliament to this end. Roman Catholic petitions for the amendment of the Nineteenth Clause of the Common Schools Act were also received. The result of these actions and agitations was twofold.

George Brown, self-appointed champion of Protestant ascendancy, took up the editorial cudgel against both groups of separatists. He agreed that Anglicans should have the same rights as Roman Catholics *if* separate schools were to continue, but the cry of "religion in danger" was in his opinion just a priestly scheme to gain control of the educational system for sectarian and sacerdotal ends. Would no member of Parliament bring forward a bill to repeal the controversial Clause Nineteen and dispose of the question for all time?[16] Ironically it was the "little Rebel," William Lyon Mackenzie, recent victor over Brown in a parliamentary by-election, who introduced such an amendment to the Government's remedial bill to eradicate those "nurseries of strife and dissension,"[17] the separate schools.

Mackenzie's amendment got only five votes and the government bill now permitting separate schools to be set up in each ward of a municipality, was carried, to the avowed satisfaction of the Roman Catholic authorities. But as extremes beget extremes, so Mackenzie's abortive amendment and the *Globe's* open antagonism to separate schools aroused feelings of insecurity and uneasiness among Roman Catholics, already on the defensive because of the "Papal Aggression" controversy. No longer were separate schools a sufficient "protection from insult." A "war of total separation" had been opened between the forces of denominationalism and nationalism for control of elementary education.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 240; X, p. 88. Some 34,000 destitute Irish settled in Toronto in 1847 alone.
15. *Ibid.*, X, pp. 91–92.
16. *Globe*, June 24, 1851.
17. *DHE*, IX, p. 237 *et seq.*

II. The War of Total Separation

Early in 1852 several incidents occurred which brought Ryerson and de Charbonnel into open conflict. When de Charbonnel complained on behalf of the separate school at Chatham that its share of the provincial grant was too small, Ryerson defended the financial disparity by the letter of the law. Next the bishop charged that an anti-Catholic book was used in the Chatham common school, and denounced the educational system as "a regular disguised persecution."[18] Ryerson replied that no child was forced to read any objectionable book, but de Charbonnel added the accusation that mixed schools were the "ruin of religion, and a persecution of the Church." "We must have, and we will have the full management of our Schools, as well as Protestants in Lower Canada."

To this latest demand, which set the tempo for the issue until Confederation, Ryerson retorted that it originated in the "new class of ideas and feelings" which the bishop had imported from Europe, and he contrasted it to the policy of the late Bishop Power. The existence of separate schools was in the opinion of Ryerson and the majority of the Province regrettable and inexpedient, but Ryerson denied that he had ever been unjust to Roman Catholics. When a financial problem similar to that in Chatham arose in Belleville, de Charbonnel threatened to use his episcopal authority to remove Roman Catholic children from mixed schools. Worsted in the argument by Ryerson's logic and superior knowledge of the facts, the bishop terminated the controversy abruptly but ominously. "I hope that by making use of all constitutional means, in order to obtain our right, I will not upset the Government of Canada nor its institutions."

Thus a corner was turned in the development of separate schools in Canada West, and the ideological bases were clearly stated. For de Charbonnel and some Roman Catholics, though not all, separate schools had become an inalienable right which must be obtained to satisfy the conscientious convictions of their religious belief. Ryerson, however, saw in the Roman Catholic demands not only a threat to his school system but to the national unity towards which it was directed. The "war of total separation," if successful, would create a nation within a nation.

In response to revived pressure put upon him under a new administration, Ryerson proposed, in a draft of a revised bill, to relieve separate school supporters of paying any common school tax and to permit them to share the provincial grant according to school attendance. But he urged that municipalities should not be forced to become tax collectors for separate schools. "The very mention of a separate column on the Tax Roll for a Separate School, excites an hostility and feeling which you can hardly imagine," he told Hincks.[19] Behind the scenes, Archbishop Turgeon of

18. *Copies of Correspondence between the Roman Catholic Bishop of Toronto and the Chief Superintendent of Schools on the Subject of Separate Common Schools in Upper Canada . . .* (Toronto, 1853), p. 7 *et seq.*
19. *DHE*, X, p. 163.

Quebec assured de Charbonnel that Morin had pledged himself and his colleagues to give the Roman Catholics of Upper Canada the same advantages as the Protestants of Lower Canada enjoyed, and Attorney General Richards also had promised as much to the bishops.

In 1852 Strachan and some High Church Anglicans again petitioned Parliament against the alleged injustice and irreligion of the common schools, and that same year the Reverend Adam Townley, a convert from Methodism, abetted his bishop's efforts with a pamphlet against the school system in which he pointed to the prostitutes of Paris as living evidence of the results of secular education. Townley claimed that, as the Church of England comprised one third of the population of Canada West (in fact it was only 22%), the establishment of separate Anglican schools was a "Democratic Right."[20]

In the Assembly Bishop Strachan's petition for Anglican schools was read and ignored, while the secularizationists were petitioning for an end to Clergy Reserves, rectories and separate schools. Petitions from the Roman Catholic bishops of Kingston and London arrived praying for amendment of the Common School Act of 1850. Weeks passed and the Government showed no signs of introducing Ryerson's draft bill. At last in mid-October, Archbishop Turgeon petitioned for the same privileges for Roman Catholics in Canada West as Protestants had in Canada East. Attorney General Richards sent Ryerson a bill prepared by a French Canadian legislator, and Ryerson hastened to Quebec to defend his system from this latest threat.

A compromise bill drafted by Ryerson was finally introduced, but too many Ministerial cooks had made hash of the measure and it was returned to Ryerson for revision during the winter prorogation. Before Parliament reconvened Richards obtained the *nihil obstat* of the Roman Catholic members and after four more months the Bill reached the Committee of the Whole. Outside Parliament, the Clear Grit and Brownite presses were loudly denouncing the bill as the destruction of the national education system. Petitions from Canada West indicated that that section unanimously favoured the abolition of separate schools. The only petitions demanding separate Roman Catholic schools for Canada West came significantly from Canada East, particularly Quebec where the perambulating Parliament was currently sitting.

Despite the opposition of Brown and the Grits the Act was passed, thanks to Lower Canadian votes. To Roman Catholics the measure gave personal pecuniary relief, and sustenance for their separate schools, while leaving the conditions for establishment and the division of the grant unchanged. But to "broad Protestants" like George Brown these were signs of "priestly encroachments" which threatened the very destiny of the nation.[21]

20. Adam Townley, *Seven Letters on the Non-Religious Common School System of Canada and the United States*, (Toronto, 1853), p. 51.

21. *Globe*, April 2 and 5, 1853; cf. Francis Hincks, *Reminiscences of his Public Life*, (Montreal, 1884), p. 312.

Ryerson announced publicly that separate schools were "practically harmless" to the school system, and he still believed that experience would soon convince Roman Catholics of their disadvantages and inexpediency.[22] He could not foresee the future numerical increase of separate schools, or future Lower Canadian interference with Upper Canadian education. Many parties remained unconvinced by the Chief Superintendent's logic.

The real test of the Act's popularity, however, would be the reaction of its prime movers, the Roman Catholic hierarchy. De Charbonnel was jubilant and issued a pastoral letter commending the measure. But his tone soon changed when he discovered that Toronto Common School Trustees were hiring Roman Catholic teachers, thus depriving his church of the legal right to maintain separate schools in that city. Hincks promised to investigate and if necessary to introduce a new bill, though Ryerson was left in ignorance of this latter part of the agreement. Before the session of 1854 began, Bishop de Charbonnel issued a statement demanding equal educational rights for Uppr Canadian Roman Catholics. With seven other bishops he petitioned the "aid and protection" of the Governor General "to obtain a just and equitable law in favour of Separate Schools."[23] Before this petition reached Parliament the Hincks-Morin Government was defeated and appealed to the country in a general election. Bishop de Charbonnel wrote numerous members of Parliament requesting new separate school legislation, either in prospect or consequence of support given in their elections. Three changes were desired—exemption for Roman Catholics from paying to the separate school an amount equal to the common school rate, power to unite municipal separate school corporations into a single Board of Trustees, and direct payment of school money by the Chief Superintendent. Ryerson had no objection to the first two proposals, but he considered the third a "frivolous" attempt to place him in a vulnerable position for further agitation.[24] He went on to refute thirteen points of inequality, alleged by the Bishop, between the separate school law of the two parts of the Province. Ryerson gave Hincks a draft bill covering the desired changes at the same time advising that the policy of conciliation had now reached its limit in the eyes of Upper Canadians, for Protestants had "conscientious conviction" as strong as those of Roman Catholics.[25]

Before any action was taken the Reform regime ended and the MacNab-Morin coalition took office pledged to carry out the Hincks-Morin programme. The separate school bill was now entrusted to John A. Macdonald who promised the Roman Catholic bishops satisfaction and justice, but he put off any action until 1855. Suspicious that the delay and silence implied a scheme on the part of Ryerson and Macdonald, the Upper Canadian

22. *DHE*, X, pp. 295–302.
23. *Ibid.*, XI, p. 109.
24. *Dr. Ryerson's Letters in reply to the Attacks of the Hon. George Brown, M.P.P.*, (Toronto, 1859), p. 32.
25. *DHE*, XXI, pp. 8–9, *et passim.*

bishops forwarded a "protestation" (identical to de Charbonnel's statement of the previous summer) and a bill of their own.[26]

Ryerson, summoned in haste to the capital, explained that the bishops' bill was inadmissible and the protestation inaccurate. The bill would have created a special superintendent of separate schools, made the municipalities tax collectors for the separate schools, and given separate schools an equivalent for any improvement made to a common school. Instead Ryerson offered de Charbonnel the conditions he had outlined to Hincks, but discussion proved fruitless. Six weeks after he had returned to Toronto, believing he had convinced the Attornies General, Ryerson was informed privately that G. E. Taché had introduced a different separate school bill in the Legislative Council one week before. Ryerson advised Macdonald that only the High Anglicans would benefit since the bill permitted anyone subscribing even a nominal sum to a private school to avoid all taxes. Macdonald took the cue and restricted its terms to Roman Catholics.

The session was old before the bill came into the Assembly. The *Globe* of May 22 announced it as a crisis in the rule of Canada—"Romish Priests" *versus* enlightened principles. What had Taché to do with the schools of Canada West? Opposition to the bill cut across party lines, but the bill passed on the day before adjournment by a majority composed almost exclusively of Lower Canadians in a House reduced to one third. The votes had placed on the statute books the first Separate School Act of Canada West.

The new Act permitted five Roman Catholic heads of families to establish a separate school regardless of the religion of the common school teacher, assured separate schools of a share of the legislative grant proportional to school attendance, and in theory at least left Roman Catholics a choice of which system they would support. The Act fell short of the demands of de Charbonnel, but in later years Ryerson could point out that the bishops' grievances were of their own making since they had drafted Taché's Act.

De Charbonnel had given his approval and thanked the Government for this measure of justice to his church. Scarcely had he arrived back in Toronto, however, before he discovered that he had been duped again by the amendments made after his departure. "He has got a new light," Macdonald warned Ryerson, "and now he says the Bill won't do."[27] The Chief Superintendent was advised to play the peace-maker by stressing the Act's innocuous effects on the Common School System, ("this for the people at large," wrote Macdonald) and its beneficence for Roman Catholics, "this to keep them in good humour." But Macdonald feared that de Charbonnel might renew the "unwholesome agitation."

The unwholesome agitation did not reappear until the new year, 1856, and then it originated with an outraged Protestantism. Robert Corrigan, an

26. H. C. McKeown, *The Life and Labors of Most Rev. John Joseph Lynch, D.D. Cong. Miss., First Archbishop of Toronto*, (Montreal, 1886), p. 296, n.; *DHE*, XII, 16–19.

27. *DHE*, XII, p. 40.

Irish Roman Catholic convert to Protestantism, was literally kicked and beaten to death by Roman Catholics in a quarrel at a fair in St. Sylvester, a small town south of Quebec City. The acquittal of the killers by a Roman Catholic judge and jury seemed a travesty of justice, and the government seemed incapable or unwilling to interfere in the matter. The horrible murder of Corrigan shocked Canadian Protestants, uniting Tory and Radical in a cry for the abolition of separate schools in Canada West as partial payment of the debt demanded by Corrigan's blood. Protestant unrest was further increased by de Charbonnel's pronouncement in his Lenten Pastoral that Roman Catholics who did not employ their franchise in the separate school cause were guilty of mortal sin. Even moderate newspapers spoke "against a despotism that would crush liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, a despotism unknown to members of Protestant communions."[28]

When the legislators met in February, 1856, they were greeted by a flood of petitions demanding outright repeal of separate school legislation and only one petition in their defence. Despite the unmistakable display of Upper Canadian opinion through mass meetings and petitions, the Upper Canadian Roman Catholic bishops applied to the Government for an amendment to the Separate School Act. Macdonald and his colleagues were too sensitive to the Protestant temper to venture any ministerial measure thereon. Within two weeks of Parliament's opening, however, J. G. Bowes introduced a private bill to exempt separate school supporters from paying common school rates simply by producing a receipt for taxes paid to the separate school. The bill never reached second reading—in any case it was less than the Roman Catholic bishops desired. But it did revive Bishop Strachan's interest in obtaining Anglican schools. "Surely our claim is as good as that of the Roman Catholics," he wrote John Hillyard Cameron.[29]

The Legislature had not heard the last of the separate school question. When George Brown moved for repeal of all separate school legislation, W. L. Felton countered with de Charbonnel's favourite amendment—the same rights for Roman Catholics in Canada West as for dissentients in Canada East. After a night-long debate and twelve fruitless divisions, the debate was postponed. When resumed, five weeks later, Felton's amendment was voted down. The Roman Catholic hierarchy felt that the Government had broken its pledge and de Charbonnel denounced four Roman Catholic cabinet members in a letter read from every pulpit in his diocese.

De Charbonnel's actions disturbed Protestants more than they did Roman Catholics. The press charged that popish ascendancy was interfering with private judgment and parliamentary responsibility. The Bishop was accused of "filtering British liberty through the will and pleasure of the Roman Catholic Church."[30] Thus the separate school question was cutting across

28. *News of the Week*, February 2, 1856.
29. Ontario Archives, Strachan Papers, Letter book 1854–1862, p. 124, J. Strachan to J. H. Cameron, March 10, 1856.
30. *News of the Week*, July 11, 1856.

established religious and political party lines, even those of the Orangemen. For the first time Protestant churches other than the Church of England entered the controversy when the Free Church and Wesleyan Methodists officially supported the common school system. Within the Church of England, however, the issue caused an open rupture when Strachan once more attacked the common schools at his visitation to the Clergy, and the Low Church element gathered strength rapidly in opposition to the separatist tendencies of the High Church faction.

For six years after Bowes' bill touched off that memorable debate in the Assembly, the separate school question provided a recurrent theme for editorials, but no major alterations were made in the existing law. De Charbonnel retired to a French monastery and his polemical duties were assumed by J. M. Bruyère, rector of St. Michael's Cathedral, who, with the assistance of Bishop Pinsonnault of London, carried on a war of words against Ryerson. A river of ink was spilled either for or against separate schools. D'Arcy McGee split and confused the Roman Catholics by insisting that the existing separate school law was useless and Brown seriously compromised the radical Reform position by adopting Thomas D'Arcy McGee's ideal of the Irish school system for the four-day ministry of 1858.

Not until 1860 was the burning issue reopened in earnest. Ryerson was in Quebec when R. W. Scott, member for Ottawa, introduced a new separate school bill, which would permit the establishment of separate schools in villages and towns (an omission by oversight in the Taché Act) and eliminate the annual notice required of separate school supporters. Both were reasonable proposals, but they were also a sharp spur to the "high Protestant" horse ridden by George Brown and the bill did not even get a second reading. The following year the persistent Mr. Scott introduced his bill again, but it got even less attention. In 1862, however, the Roman Catholic *Canadian Freeman* demanded that the Ministry redeem pledges which, the *Freeman* of January 24, 1862 said, had been given at the 1861 election in exchange for Roman Catholic votes. Ryerson offered Bishop Lynch of Toronto a bill based on Scott's, but Bishop Horan of Kingston held out for some more final measure to settle the long-vexed question.

Here the problem stood in April, 1862, when Scott once more introduced a separate school bill. This latest bill, however, was radically different from its two predecessors, for it smacked of the rankest ultramontanism. Priests were to be *ex officio* trustees, the Church was to control all rules and curricula in separate schools, and the schools themselves were to be exempt from observance of common school holidays and free to set their own. At the second reading Scott announced that the bill had Ryerson's approval. In fact, Ryerson was ill and had not even seen the bill. When he did see it, he advised Macdonald that "it ought by all means to be rejected."[31] After a two days' debate the bill was given a vote of government approval at two in the morning. Macdonald explained to Ryerson that Dick Scott was "a

31. *DHE*, XVII, p. 214; *ibid.*, pp. 198–213.

very *good* fellow although no Solon," and assured Ryerson that the bill would be changed in Committee.[32]

Before the bill came back from the select Committee, however, the John A. Macdonald-Cartier Government had been replaced by the John S. Macdonald-Sicotte Government. Purged of its ultramontane clause by the combined efforts of the Committee and Ryerson the bill was accepted by two Roman Catholic Vicars General only to be shelved for the session by the new cabinet. When it was reintroduced in 1863 the popular excitement it created surpassed any caused by earlier agitation. Opposition amendments were ineffective, yet on the final vote the Upper Canadians opposed the bill thirty-one to twenty-one. Upper Canadian opinion was in a ferment against the measure. Despite McGee's promise of finality, the *Globe* skeptically recalled the warning of the Roman Catholic *Freeman* that the concessions were only an instalment, and the *Freeman* itself soon confirmed the *Globe*'s fears.[33] In the general elections which followed, separate schools and "No Popery" were made touchstones for candidates, and the results in at least a dozen constituencies were affected. Numbered among the fallen was Dick Scott.

As Canada turned to consideration of Confederation in 1864 the separate school agitation subsided. The Quebec resolutions vested educational matters in the local legislatures, but accepted McGee's rider to protect minority rights by freezing the separate school systems in each section of Canada whenever Confederation went into action. This gave the separate school advocates one last chance to assimilate the school systems of Upper and Lower Canada. The *Freeman* of January 5, 1865, called for "a grand and final struggle" to obtain the same privileges as Lower Canadian Protestants, the burden of the campaign to be borne by the Roman Catholic laity to disprove their opponents' claim that they were indifferent to their educational rights.

Apparently the laity still required some prodding or guidance, for more than half of the thirty-three petitions favouring assimilation of the laws which reached the Assembly in 1865 were forwarded by clerics. Ryerson hastened to the defence of the existing system, averring that the concession of 1863 had been accepted as final. The whole excuse for reopening the question was the attempt of some Montreal Protestants to obtain a completely separate school system in Lower Canada. McGee, who had accepted publicly the finality of the Act of 1863, now insisted that if any changes were made in Lower Canada he would demand equal advantages for his co-religionists in the upper provinces. The Government refused to divulge its plans, announcing that the final educational settlement must await Imperial approval. Despite the opposition on both flanks the Quebec resolutions were successfully pushed through without altering the educational clause.

32. C. B. Sissons, *Life and Letters of Egerton Ryerson*, 2 v. (Toronto, 1937, 1947), II, p. 466.
33. *Globe*, March 20, 1863; *Canadian Freeman*, March 19, 1863.

When the United Parliament met in its last session in 1866 Confederation was almost a *fait accompli*. Scott's Separate School Act of 1863 had been accepted for better or worse, and the popular reaction to the recent attempt to upset it indicated that the legislation promised for this session was predestined to failure. Finance Minister Galt, the reluctant spokesman for the Lower Canadian Protestants, introduced the expected bill. The answer of the Roman Catholics was a separate school bill introduced by Robert Bell, an undisguised *quid pro quo* which had the support of nine Roman Catholic bishops. The net result of this manoeuvre was the withdrawal of both bills, the resignation of Galt, and great excitement in the Protestant press of Canada West. The newspapers heralded the demise of Bell's bill as THE LATEST PAPAL IMPERTINENCE and THE BISHOPS FOILED.[34] The only residue was a heritage of bitterness shared by both parties to the separate school question.

Thus Scott's Act of 1863 set the pattern of elementary education for Ontario which remains practically unaltered. If at the moment of passing it seemed a victory for separatism and a defeat to nationalism, it has on the longer view proved itself an acceptable compromise.

34. Bowmanville *Statesman*, August 9, 1866; St. Catharines *Constitutional*, August 9, 1866.

The Marks of Effective Preaching

DONALD MACLEOD

IT is becoming rather commonplace and trite to say that we are witnessing a religious heyday in America. Indeed most of us have ceased to wonder at rising statistics and constantly expanding plans and programs. Any set of comparative tables shows distinctive gains in church membership, safe financial balances, and more than casual interest in what religious leaders are saying and thinking. Consequently there has grown up a disposition among church folk to greet these indices with a smile of satisfaction and to take them in their stride.

There is, however, one curious aspect of all this, and indeed in many ways a disturbing one: that this expansion has not been due in a clearly definable sense to preaching, except in some isolated cases. The burgeoning interest in religion in contemporary American suburbia is traced sometimes more easily to "me-too-ism" and "the socially acceptable thing to do" than to the drawing power of the preacher's Sunday morning sermon. There seems to be "something in the wind," whether it be community pressure or the desire for social recognition, that wields a stronger influence than the exactness of the preacher's exegesis or the orthodoxy of the doctrines he presents.

Certainly no preacher among us can remain happy or at ease in the face of this situation, especially when he considers the implications that lie beneath the surface. Moreover, it leads him to ask questions which can bring uncomfortable answers. He cannot, for example, avoid the query, How goes it with preaching? And for the answer he need not go any further than to review certain facts that are written large across the face of every parish. People are attending worship in very sizeable numbers, yet religious illiteracy is widespread and is increasing at an alarming rate. Less than a fraction of those who sing with apparent abandon on Sunday morning, "O use me, Lord . . . Just as Thou wilt, and when, and where," ever realize they have thereby committed themselves to live by Christian precepts during the week. Indeed more than one preacher has felt a chill of futility when a parishioner remarked at the door, "Yes, what you say is true, but who can live up to it?"

All this drives the preacher back to his study to search his own soul and to grapple with further questions: Why isn't preaching making the impact it ought on this twentieth century society? Why isn't preaching moulding and giving some meaningful direction to this revival of interest in the church and religion? Is the efficacy of contemporary preaching of so little consequence that most of us agree with John A. Mackay, when he said, "The forces that are moulding the opinions of youth in America today are not the churches, nor the universities, nor the schools, but secular powers that portend no good"? These questions indicate that the preacher is confronted

with the biggest problem ever, not of empty pews, but of sanctuaries full of people whose day to day attitudes and moods are shaped by forces which seem to be stronger than preaching and which preaching does not touch.

Edwin C. Dargan, in the Introduction to *A History of Preaching*, writes, "Preaching has profoundly and for the most part wholesomely influenced the morals and customs of mankind." Then in a review of the preaching of the centuries he presents a thousand pages of evidence to strengthen his thesis. Is the present day, then, to be an exception? Or, may it not be more appropriate to ask: In what way has contemporary preaching been ineffective? In the confrontation of these great congregations with the voice from the pulpit, has the latter been at fault or unequal to its opportunity? Now it is not easy either to praise or blame within the limited perspective of the present, yet there are certain answers we can give and observations which justifiably we can make.

First of all, there is a sense in which much contemporary preaching has been ineffective simply because of an effort on the part of the preacher always to be popular. By "popular" we do not refer merely to the "catchy topic" of a sermon or the presence of the "glamor boy" in the pulpit, but rather a type of preaching that says what people want to hear, that hesitates to uncover basic human needs and to prescribe how to treat them. What do people want generally to hear? Almost invariably they clamor to be given some neat and succinct formula, some simple technique, that can always be counted upon to produce an answer to what they consider to be their best desires. Among these is the desire for authority, but an authority of a special type. It is not an authority with a demand, but one in which they can rest comfortably. There is also the desire to be in with the crowd, not to be its higher conscience, but to have its shelter. As for salvation—well, it must be by a quick decision with a touch of glamor here and there, with guilt disposed of almost by fiat, and certainly without lonely hours in which the soul, shaken by tears, stands stripped of all twentieth century advantages and comforts. Preaching that refuses to disturb this type of mind and its fictitious wants will undoubtedly be popular, but at the same time exceedingly ineffective.

Again, there is a sense in which much contemporary preaching has been ineffective because it has been devoid of emotion. Now there is an obvious difference between preaching with emotion and emotional preaching. Sheer emotionalism that is an end in itself has done much to discredit preaching, especially in the eyes of intelligent people. But equally ineffective has been preaching that has lacked emotion entirely. Recently someone asked the Moderator of the United Church of Canada what he thought of the preaching he heard across the country and he replied that much of it was competent but "not very inspiring." And W. B. J. Martin in his recent book, entitled *The Diary of Peter Parson*, writes, "The sermon in the typical Protestant Church is an argument to be followed, whereas it ought to be an event to be experienced." The affirmation of great Christian certainties from

the lips of men who have lived by them, who therefore endorse them with flaming conviction, would counteract any tendencies in contemporary preaching to fall short of its full effectiveness.

Further, it may be said that whenever preaching is divorced from the total context of worship its nature and impact are weakened. Now worship, to put it simply, is the church's response to what God has done for us in Jesus Christ. It is man's overture of thanks and faith and obedience to the proclamation of the mighty act of God. As in Isaiah's moving experience in the Temple, the vision came first and then by means of its authentic note the prophet was moved to respond with his whole being. By the same token, if preaching that is within the context of worship is not of a quality similar to that blazing unveiling in the Temple, the response to it may not seem worth making. This indicates therefore that preaching takes on its highest significance only within the framework of a genuine act of worship.

But it is just here that much preaching has run into ineffectiveness. Divorced from the constraint and demand of the context of true worship, the role of the preacher and the calibre of his preaching have deteriorated in meaning and quality. With the risk of being dubbed as old-fashioned, one cannot help expressing apprehension over the new concept of the preacher as a sort of "pastor-director" of the congregation or as a sanctified manager of the organization. In this capacity it is so easy for the warrant and thrust of his preaching to become blunted; he may not appear to be saying to his own soul what he says to the souls of others; he seems to lack that deep and fearful sense of responsibility for what he addresses to men. Somehow we miss here the "ambassador for Christ" who comes out from another level of life with good news for those whose daily routine is a losing battle with secular powers that are too much for them.

Here then are several reasons why much contemporary preaching has been ineffective: the effort to be popular, not entirely in the wrong way but for the wrong reasons; the absence of that emotion that is kindled by the tremendous facts of our message; and the separation of preaching from the context of true worship. There are doubtless other reasons, but these are sufficient to indicate where we are.

What can be done then to make preaching more purposeful? Or, to put it another way: What are the marks of effective preaching?

In our search for answers it is natural to go to the Bible. It must be made clear, however, that we do not go there for homiletical theory, because (1) most sermons recorded in Holy Scripture must be regarded not as whole accounts, but as excerpts; and (2) whatever homiletical patterns were useful and effective in those days could hardly be employed in ours. What we look for are characteristics and principles which were not only sufficient to cause these original messages to be written down, but to achieve among the hearers the phenomenal results they did.

The first necessity for effective preaching is the element of proclamation. James S. Stewart was right in selecting for the title of his book on preaching,

The Heralds of God. There are other things the preacher is, but first and last he must be a herald; he has good news to declare concerning something accomplished, something done by God in the realm of spiritual conflict which has had tremendous consequences for every man's life in every age. Moreover, in this capacity the preacher is playing his highest role because his is a timely proclamation to an anxious humanity which cries, "Is there any word from the Lord?" And what is more, this proclamation has its own peculiar character; it speaks of a thing done, a victory won, but within it is a *decisiveness* that alters forever the character and destiny of all who hear and accept it. When the famous American contralto, Marion Anderson, made her recent goodwill tour throughout the Orient, she was discussing with a group of children in Bangkok the emancipation of her own race by Abraham Lincoln, and in order to make clear to them what a proclamation meant she described it as a paper which says, "Now, we'll do things differently." The New Testament proclamation is "Because I live, ye shall live also." The fact is there: "Because I live." "Ye shall live also" means that from now on, everything will be different.

The handling of this proclamation can make the difference between effective and ineffective preaching. Some simply shout it without any concrete embodiment of its moral and spiritual implications in their own life and character. They are not convincing examples themselves of Christian truth alive. Speaking of his own early preaching, Emil Brunner remarked, "I was like a sandwich man carrying boards advertising a square meal while I myself was starving." Others take some human need and diagnose it thoroughly, and then go to the Bible to find some specific religious truth that seems to be the solution to the problem. But the unfortunate result of this procedure is that they never present a *whole* gospel because the many and complex needs of men dictate and control the range and thrust of their preaching.

How very different in their methods were the preachers of the early church! Their proclamation was "Jesus and the Resurrection." And their character was an intimate reflection of the essence of this proclamation. This is why they moved the world and set into motion forces that have moulded the temper of generations. Therefore the truly effective preacher today must know basically the substance of his proclamation and must be himself a living endorsement of its truth. Then he need never be concerned about its relevance. Irrelevant preaching is the fault of those who do not know what the Gospel really is or how actually to live it. The man whose message is merely a watered-down brand of moral ethic to which he gives assent has nothing to say, nothing to declare, to this generation. Effective preaching begins with the man who claims that God's "word was in mine heart as a burning fire" (Jer. 20:9), and who cannot be restrained from preaching its redemptive efficacy for every man, regardless of his peculiar need.

The second necessity for effective preaching is the element of interpretation. The preacher must proclaim the message, but an interpretation of it is essential also. Interpretation means presenting the unknown in terms of the known, the unseen in the garment of the seen, or the abstract by means of the concrete. In preaching this operation can have its perils, and among them is the danger that the preacher may distort the proclamation and preach himself and not Christ. To prevent any such happening he must not overlook the fact that in preaching there is a further side to interpretation: it is not complete until the hearer examines his life in the light of the Bible's terms, and is thus forced to a decision about himself. It is a matter of seeing life against what Sidney Berry called "the great objective backdrop." Against the backdrop of the proclamation, the preacher must lead his hearers to ask: What are all my moods and hopes and desires in the face of this? Take, for example, Jesus' parables. They are not just simple stories intended to illustrate how God might act in a given life-situation. As such they would be a weak and faulty method and vehicle of interpretation, as any similar sermon might be. In every New Testament setting that gave rise to a parable, over and above everything was the proclamation that the Kingdom was present, and then the parable became the means of interpreting the hearers to themselves. In each of these situations men were confronted by God and by themselves, and in this great experience they decided for or against embracing the new life of the Kingdom.

This further aspect of interpretation must be brought into contemporary preaching in order that its ends may be realized. Far too many preachers have become merely illustrative addicts and therefore (to quote George Johnstone Jeffrey) "their method of sermon preparation seems to be the search for three anecdotes, setting them down like three islands in a homiletical sea, the rest of the sermon consisting in swimming breathlessly from one to the other in the lively hope of coming safely to land." Now illustrations are necessary in preaching to a generation that thinks in pictures, but they must be employed within a proper understanding of pulpit interpretation. They must not be moralistic stories that point up a technique by which to get through another day. Illustrations should be only a means to assist the hearers to see their common identification with the situation to which the Gospel is proclaimed. Illustrations are part of the machinery of that interpretative process that is completed only when the hearer sees the blazing truth of God's proclamation and his own deep need of salvation.

The third necessity for effective preaching is to have the prophetic accent. For modern folk who are caught up in the stern business of daily living, preaching that is not prophetic does not claim their interest or response, nor can it elicit the dedication of their will. The prophetic quality gives to preaching that peculiar challenge that prevents people throwing up their hands and remarking, "He's got nothing to say to me." It puts into preaching the very thing that people need from preaching. After reading

the morning newspaper with its parade of all the ugly sins and tensions of mankind, a man said, "When I go to church on Sunday I hope my minister will tell me whose world it is—God's or the devil's."

Now what is meant by "prophetic preaching?" Its two main ingredients are the first two necessities we mentioned: proclamation and interpretation. The prophetic preacher sees God and he sees man. From God he catches the authentic note "Thus saith the Lord"; and with his knowledge of the deeper levels of human conscience he says to men, "Thou art the man." To use a phrase from Otto Baab, the preacher proclaims "a commanding truth to lift men up to God" and "to reveal them to themselves." After all, the aim of the prophetic preacher is to change the world, not God. His message therefore will have a cutting edge which will expose and score evil and warn against its inevitable consequences. He will not be daunted by the overwhelming odds of moral indifference among everyday people, but will preach with such a sense of urgency that men and women will be moved to search their own inner being and to take positive action towards personal and social betterment. To quote Dr. Baab again, "The prophet's task is so to preach as to keep himself and his people in constant tension with the world and to help them maintain a constant maladjustment to the evil that besets it." He will have vitality also which is not merely a matter of churning himself up physically or emotionally, but which comes from a keen awareness of the indispensability of the Christian Gospel for life and from the conviction that it provides the only solution to the sense of "nothingness" and "way-out-less-ness" of this hour. And with this sense of what is vital there is the conviction that this Gospel is final, that it saves men from their helpless moral condition to a life which eclipses the best the world can afford.

Book Reviews

The Letter and the Spirit. By R. M. Grant. London: S.P.C.K. (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre), 1957. Pp. viii, 161. $3.00.

Recent years have witnessed a renewal of interest in patristic studies. For readers of English there have been such new series of translations as those of *The Library of Christian Classics* and *Ancient Christian Writers*; new editions of texts, such as Dr. Ernest Evans' notable work on certain treatises of Tertullian; and learned expositions of patristic thought (as in the writings of the late G. L. Prestige and in the Bampton lectures for 1952 and 1954). The largely attended International Patristic Conference at Oxford in the autumn of 1955 under the chairmanship of Dr. F. L. Cross, at which the author of the book to be considered and the reviewer were present, is further evidence of this revival.

The fathers were much concerned with biblical exposition. A morning spent in glancing through the contents of the Greek and Latin texts of Migne, for example, makes this abundantly evident. Yet very little attention, relatively speaking, has been paid to this aspect of patristic study. By way of accounting for the deficiency Dr. Grant quotes in his preface Milton's famous opinion of the fathers, as well as F. W. Farrar's evaluation of patristic exegesis in his *History of Interpretation*, the Bampton lectures for 1886. Yet it might be observed that even while Milton was writing his tract *Of Prelatical Episcopacy* Henry Hammond was engaged upon his great English commentary on the New Testament, in which the Greek fathers, notably St. Chrysostom and Origen, were to be cited as never before in England. Nor are Farrar's judgments invariably reliable, as Miss Beryl Smalley has sufficiently demonstrated in her *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages*. Farrar considered that the foundations of Origen's exegetic system were "built upon the sand." Dr. Grant's book is an attempt to understand Origen's methods "in relation to the history of Greek allegorical exegesis and the related problem of the meaning of poetic and prophetic inspiration" (p. viii). The work indicates as well that one cannot summarily dismiss the intellect of the early fathers and provides a prolegomenon to the history of the allegorical method of biblical exposition that still remains to be written.

As does Dr. Grant's earlier book *The Bible in the Church*, *The Letter and the Spirit* surveys in succinct fashion a wide expanse. The main subjects are interpretation and inspiration, and more than a thousand years are covered in slightly more than a hundred pages. Greek doctrines of poetic and oracular inspiration are traced from early classical times to the third Christian century, and some of the ways in which these beliefs are related to allegorical exegesis are indicated. The wisdom of the ancients in these

matters, Jewish methods of interpreting the Old Testament in the Hellenistic period, the theories of interpolation implicit in the exegesis of Jesus, the conflict over the interpretation of the Bible in the second and the climax of allegorization in the third century in Origen are all discussed. The book concludes with a series of appendices on the contents of Marcion's Gospel, Greek exegetical terminology, textual and literary criticism in the early church, and the *Cohortatio ad Graecos* once ascribed to Justin.

Much the best part of the book is to be found in the later chapters, and Dr. Grant does not fail to show that the two tendencies in early patristic approach to the Bible, advocacy of a *sensus plenior* and support of interpolation theories, have left their mark upon the biblical and theological scholarship of today. The repeated references to the writings of modern outstanding patristic scholars on the European continent, notably in France, Germany and Scandinavia, are refreshing. It seems strange, however, that nowhere does one find mention of either Professor H. E. W. Turner's *The Pattern of Christian Truth* or the Rev. R. L. P. Milburn's *Early Christian Interpretations of History*. Not all of Dr. Grant's opinions on New Testament matters are beyond cavil. He places *Galations* late, "about the years 53 or 54" (p. 47), and although he describes *I Peter* as pseudonymous he allows the possibility of Pauline authorship for *Ephesians* (p. 54). But the main contribution of the book lies in its delineation of the origins of the allegorical method of exegesis and in its underlining of the values that this type of interpretation preserved.

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The Early Christian Church. By Philip Carrington. Cambridge: The University Press (Toronto: The Macmillan Company), 1957. Volume One: *The First Christian Century*. Pp. xx, 520; Volume Two: *The Second Christian Century*. Pp. xiii, 519. $17.50.

In these two finely produced volumes the Anglican archbishop of Quebec provides a very personal introduction to the history of the first two centuries of the Church. Believing that "the process of theoretical reconstruction has gone far enough," he sets out to write "a useful reference book for the persons and events of the period." The two centuries are defined as five generations of forty years each, beginning at A.D. 30 and ending at A.D. 230, but in fact the narrative starts, without explanation, with Alexander the Great and ends with the Council of Nicea in A.D. 325. Indeed, chapter 26 of volume two deals in thirty pages with the entire Third Christian Century, which compares with the five hundred pages of volume one; and the reason alleged for such treatment is that without this epilogue "our narrative would not be complete or self-explanatory." One might rejoin that any scheme which demanded A.D. 230 as its terminal date is quite arbitrary and

hardly defensible. It would have been simpler to end with Irenaeus and Tertullian in the west and Clement of Alexandria in the east, without concerning the book with a full history of the first quarter of the third century as usually understood.

The life and ministry of Jesus are allowed seven pages, with a supplement more than 200 pages later from rabbinic traditions collected by Klausner. Is this adequate?

Carrington insists that history must be founded on a close study of the sources, and so his book turns out to be almost more concerned with the Christian literature of the period, its authenticity, date, composition, locale and so forth, than with the social, economic, and internal factors that determined the development of ecclesiastical structures, doctrines, worship, and power-relationships with the state and the paganism of the Graeco-Roman and Parthian worlds. It might have been better had the writer collected into a single volume his discussions of these sources, and had he made up his mind more definitely about the dates he would accept for them. As it is, we find a "heads I win, tails I win" technique employed: for example, in the case of the Epistle of James. If it is really early and written by James the brother of our Lord, then it rightly belongs with Acts in a history of the primitive Jerusalem congregation. If, on the other hand, it is pseudonymous and to be dated late in the first or early in the second century, then it takes another place altogether in the narrative. One must attempt to settle this issue prior to writing the history of the apostolic age; but Carrington, weary of merely "theoretical reconstructions", simply makes room for the evidence of James at two places! Of course, he would prefer James to be truly Jacobite, Palestinian, and early, for the bent of his own mind is traditional and conservative. With some naiveté he imagines that the value of oral traditions now embedded in the mass of Christian documents can be substantiated by the parallel with valuable oral traditions in his own Quebec diocese. It must be observed that our literary sources for the first two centuries are available in several forms and they preserve primitive traditions at second or third hand, and never exactly in the oral form. Without question there have been "sea changes" in the course of transmission.

Carrington's attitude to his sources may be illustrated from the treatment of legends. He will include these for what they are worth, even if they are worth almost nothing! At one place we are told that Syrian legends are "better than history in one way," for their fables and songs are evidence of Syrian imagination! Again, a tenth century legend is combined with one from the third century and used to establish a dubious point. "Each legend," he admits "is weak by itself, but they combine to form what looks like a respectable tradition." What confidence can we have in such a use of sources?

There might have been more also of a systematic character about the numismatic, epigraphic, and similar archaeological materials now available

to the historian. In spite of some excellent pictorial illustrations from archaeology, there is far too much dependence on the purely literary evidence.

The narrative proceeds from Pentecost to Nicea as one would expect, paying some attention to missionary expansion and to the growth of constitutional forms, but it is by no means a competitor to the work of Dr. Latourette. In the second volume there are good chapters on the Syrian, Asiatic, African and Gallican churches as well as the Italian, and on the whole a nice balance is kept. The chapter on the Creed, the Canon, and the Liturgy (II, p. 329ff.) may be given special mention. There are, of course, a great many controversial statements which would require many pages for any profitable discussion here, on elders, bishops, and deacons, for instance. Carrington's tone is at times almost paternalistically eirenic, and the strength of the view opposite to his own is scarcely realized (cf. I, p. 55n. on the origin of the Samaritan church). We have space simply for a few comments on the values and the weaknesses of the story presented.

The weaknesses concern style, redundancy, tautology and misleading assertions. (*a*) Often the style is very staccato, as in I, p. 277. (*b*) There is repetition about the church at Thessalonica in I, pp. 115 and 122; about the Epistle of Barnabas in I, pp. 483ff. and II, p. 39; Hegesippus is included at an early stage "so as to include him in a chapter dealing with oriental Christianity," but he reappears later (II, p. 157n.); and Theophilus of Antioch is dealt with at II, pp. 212ff. and 280ff. (*c*) Related to the foregoing are some inconsistencies, e.g.: the "first-fruits" of I Cor. 16:15 is explained as a cultic term appropriated by the Church for the continuity of its ministerial order with that of old Israel. Then in dealing with Epaenetus (I, p. 149) this is ignored. If Epaenetus as the first-fruits of Asia became the minister or bishop of Asia, as Carrington's theory implies, he should have been at home in Ephesus rather than in Rome. Carrington, however, assigns Romans 16, which refers to Epaenetus at verse 5, to Rome and offers no explanation for the appearance there of the bishop of Ephesus. Or consider how at II, p. 146 we are told that "no light has yet been shed" on the very unusual phrase "the cosmic mystery of the church" in *Didache* 11:11. In I, p. 496, Carrington himself has written that the prophet who is castigated in the *Didache* was probably accompanied by a virgin of some sort. Reference to Klauser's edition or to the commentary of Fr. Kleist would have thrown much more light on the text, but our author has made no use of Quasten's *Patrology* or of the Newman Press series on "*Ancient Christian Writers*." We may note here that Kleist also refers to the persuasive theory of Andriessen that the Epistle to Diognetus is the lost Apology of Quadratus. (*d*) There are several awkward admissions in Carrington that we know next to nothing about certain events or persons; nevertheless in the following sentence he will make quite positive statements about them (e.g. I, pp. 108, 312; II, pp. 83, 85). Thus, there were (we are told) Johannine "schools" in Asia Minor and there were "doubtless" similar schools in Palestine and Syria,

but we know nothing of them! Are they not as likely to be figments of the author's imagination, seeing that the "schools" of John and the writing "staff" of Paul are little better than his own hypotheses?

These criticisms made, let me say next that I found the treatment of Montanism and the attitude of Irenaeus toward it one of the more satisfactory to be found in recent history. I have long believed that Irenaeus was favourably disposed to the New Prophecy of Phrygia, and exhibits clear marks of its influence in his references to the Holy Spirit and prophecy in the *Adversus Haereses*. The idea that Montanism influenced the beginnings of nationalist forms of Christianity is important, though too much stress must not be laid on it. Carrington's key to the development of the Church in these formative centuries is also valuable: first, there was a Galilean tradition with Peter at its head; next, there was the family of Jesus with James of Jerusalem as its chieftain; and then there was Paul himself, presumably with a following in the western Gentile congregations. "The inner relations of this triple tradition are the key" to the history of the period and even beyond it. (I, pp. 39, 478). He suggests also that the western Pauline churches had a system of plural bishops without powers of ordination and thus dependent on the apostle and the apostle's nominee (a Timothy or a Titus), whereas the eastern churches developed an autonomous episcopacy, with plenary authority vested in a single bishop with a council of presbyters (the type found in Syria in the time of Ignatius). Later these two types were fused, or the eastern may have spread into the west.

In many other pages there are illuminating expositions of apostolic and sub-apostolic documents; I mention only the works of Hermas. The entire book is suffused with the personal views of the Archbishop, and this gives a certain charm to it. The maps and illustrations are valuable, and the production as a whole is up to the Cambridge University Press standard. I cannot conclude, however, without expressing my reservations about the adequacy of these two volumes as a narrative of the history of the period.

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The Christian Doctrine of History. By John McIntyre. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company Limited) 1957. Pp. vii, 119. $2.75.

This study by Prof. John Baillie's successor in the Chair of Divinity in Edinburgh will be of special interest to Canadian theologians. The title describes its contents with some accuracy, for unlike many of the free-ranging books on Christianity and History that have appeared since the war, this is a highly disciplined, closely organized and strictly theological work. Its actual, though not its formal, point of departure is probably to be

found in the author's suspicion that many "Heilsgeschichte" ideas have come to be used rather uncritically in recent theological writing. He rightly feels that a recitation of the "mighty acts of God" does not in itself provide either a doctrine of history or an adequate account of God's relation to history, but that such a doctrine is nonetheless demanded by the rootedness of Christianity in history.

With commendable courage and precision he begins by offering a definition as follows: "history is meaningful occurrence, and more particularly occurrence the meaning of which is a construct out of certain categories, namely, Necessity, Providence, Incarnation, Freedom and Memory" (p. 13), and the book largely consists of an examination of the way in which these categories constitute history. The definition is seriously meant. McIntyre believes that history demands its own metaphysic and cannot be resolved into something other than itself. Further, this must be a realist metaphysic, for the categories are not simply principles for a possible interpretation of history but are actually constitutive of history. "It is only when all of the categories are present and operative that historic occurrence takes place." If I correctly interpret a sentence at the foot of p. 15, Prof. McIntyre's critical realism implies that the Christian must claim that his interpretation of history is not just one among others, not just one possible interpretation "of a set of objective facts which can be scientically determined by impartial observers in the field," but the true interpretation which claims to state the conditions which are necessary for the actual occurrence of historical events, and without which the true "facts" themselves cannot be properly determined. For the Christian the "facts" are different from what they are for the unbeliever.

The detailed examination of the proposed categories of history leads to brief but systematic comments on almost the whole range of Christian doctrine. Creation, Faith, Sin, Grace, General and Special Revelation, Atonement and the Church get incidental treatment. Of the categories themselves, Incarnation receives the fullest examination, two chapters being given over to a study of Incarnation as Fulfilment and a third to the Incarnation as redemptive, recreative, creative, prospective and integrative. All this may sound somewhat scholastic. Indeed there is much that is scholastic in the best sense in Dr. McIntyre's concentration on the formal aspects of doctrine, and in his determination to exhibit the structure of his argument and to conceal nothing behind what is sometimes called "literary material." But one has only to read what he has to say about Identification as a way of understanding the Atonement to recognize that this theology never becomes for its author a mere intellectual exercise. "Holiness," he writes, "is identification or involvement. The real sin of the Pharisees was contained in their name; they remained separate, cut off. Their religion was no bond between them and their fellow men. . . . In Christ we see that holiness goes forth beyond itself, identifying itself with that which it would redeem. . . . The attitude of the church to politics and society has, I feel sure, been largely

dictated by a quite false notion of holiness, one which was in the last analysis Pharisaic."

The style of this book may perplex some readers but I hope it will not deter them. There is little of the deceptive ease and refreshing quotation by which John Baillie carries his readers through the course of his argument. There are even some infelicities of style, but its bare austerity will appeal to those who seek in a volume of theology not finished quotations which can be grafted into next week's sermon or tomorrow's lecture, but materials for work and for thought. I have found more ideas in this book that invite development than in any I have read for some time. Like any serious theological attempt, it raises problems which it does not wholly answer. For instance, not all the categories which Prof. McIntyre proposes seem to belong to the same level, or as he would say, to the same "structure" of history. He distinguishes three such structures of history, (1) history interpreted as a network of secondary causes, (2) history interpreted as a whole system of necessity, and (3) history interpreted as a pattern of Divine acts. The categories of Providence and Incarnation clearly belong to the third and specifically Christian structure. But do Necessity, Freedom and Memory also belong there? If so, how are they related to the necessity, freedom and memory which secular historians may discern in the lower structures? Again, there is a *prima facie*, though not necessarily serious, contradiction in what is said about the Incarnation as fulfilment on pp. 48 and 76. But these are minor criticisms of a solid, competent and impressive study which goes far beyond the uncritical repetitions of popular "Biblical" theology and thereby proves itself the more truly Biblical. The reputation of John Baillie's chair is in strong hands.

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The Responsible Christian. By VICTOR OBENHAUS. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 1957. Pp. xi, 219. $4.00.

VICTOR OBENHAUS believes that "the fundamental problems of this and every generation are theological in nature" (p. 2). He has succeeded, to a remarkable degree, in demonstrating this truth. The purpose of *The Responsible Christian* is "to confront Christians in general and Protestants in particular with the inseparable relation between their faith and the major social issues in American life" (p. 1), and Obenhaus has made a timely and important contribution to the growing literature in this field.

The author comes to grips with ten of the most urgent and most perplexing problems of our day, viz., Economic Life, Labour and Industrial

Relations, Agricultural Policy, Race, Communism, Public and Private Welfare, Health, Church and State, Civil Rights and Christian Vocation. In each chapter the problem is set in its historical perspective, and this background material—especially that on Labour and Industrial Relations—is invaluable to the serious student of contemporary economic, social and political questions.

Obenhaus says that "the message of the book is intended primarily for laymen" (p. 1). It is this reviewer's belief that not the message only but the language, style, and method of presentation all combine to make this a book to be widely read and used by the layman. At the same time the work is well documented, scholarly and provocative, so that the interest of the trained theologian is aroused and maintained throughout.

"It is a thesis of this book that indifference to society's sore spots breeds irresponsibility and is inimical to the Christian interpretation of life" (p. vii). Therefore, while "a rich and fervent devotional life is utterly essential," nevertheless, "when one's devotion ends with one's self, it ends" (*ibid.*). If devotion is to be more than a pious self-satisfaction the Christian must understand "the implications of faith" for every sphere of life. "The gospel gives no hint that a man may be a steward of God only in selected activities that he calls 'religious' " (p. 26); "the Christian faith is applicable to every phase of a person's life . . . and economics . . . provides an unfailing test of one's real religion or faith" (p. 30). The fact that we have not seen the issues clearly, nor dealt with them theologically, may be because "the weaknesses tolerated in our society are . . . the product of a watered-down, truncated, or soft-pedaled interpretation of the faith we have called Christian" (p. 3).

It is one of the merits of the book that Obenhaus does not add to the confusion by his own soft-pedaling. Whatever his shortcomings, this is not one of them. He does not hesitate to say, for example, that "Christians have been lulled into . . . doubtful security because of the way in which Christianity has been identified with economic life as we have come to know it, particularly economic life in the United States" (p. 47). This makes for refreshing reading in face of the uncritical writing about "Christianity and the American way of life" to which we have been subject for far too long.

Among the most forthright of our author's remarks, and the deepest of his insights, are those brought to light in his discussion of communism. "To coerce Christians to act responsibly simply because Russia will win if we fail to do so is a questionable device. The simple fact is that we must conduct ourselves as Christians in economic life even if there be no communist threat" (p. 47). And again, "It is possible that the indictment by Christians of the communist revolution . . . may be in part a device to ease their consciences for defaulting on the Christian revolution. For Christianity requires a continuous revolution. . . . The communist revolution has thrived on the Christians' failure to live their own revolution" (p. 120).

Obenhaus again penetrates deeply into basic issues when he comes to consider the problems of Race. Perhaps one quotation will suffice to give a "taste" of his writing on this issue: "There seem to be many Americans who would rather lose to communism than conduct themselves as Christians in their relations with God's dark-skinned children" (p. 88).

In the chapter on Agricultural Policy, Obenhaus calls attention to the declaration of the Psalmist that "the earth is the Lord's," and then says, "This is a revolutionary assumption; it at once places man in a stewardship relation to all of life. He does not own outright; he is but a representative and a custodian" (p. 71). Our failure to understand and accept this basic biblical assumption has resulted, among other things, in "many church people being reasonably well informed about rural life in ancient Palestine. But they have not transferred their religious concern to rural life in the United States" (p. 85).

One of the best chapters in the book is the one on Christian Vocation, and here Obenhaus states that it is "rapidly becoming apparent in almost every major communion . . . that the church is where its lay people are. The church is not the clergy, the building, or the liturgy; the church is the people—the people of God . . . their worship is the dedication of what they hold most dear and what influences them most. This is their work" (p. 194).

For this reviewer the least satisfying part of an otherwise exceptionally good book is the lack of a sound and vital Christology. This lack is especially noticeable in the chapter on Health where a profound understanding of the person and work of Jesus Christ as Redeemer would have enabled Obenhaus to indicate clearly how a man finds "wholeness" in Jesus Christ. The shortcomings in the Christology of Obenhaus put the reader under a challenge. For if the reader is to be that kind of "responsible Christian" for whom Obenhaus has written this book, then he has the truly grave responsibility of bringing his best biblical and christological insights to the reading of this important work.

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GALAXY BOOKS

New York (Toronto): Oxford University Press

One of the most exciting developments in the publishing world in recent years is the appearance of paper-back books at considerably reduced prices. Since the price of regular books has been steadily rising since World War II until today such books normally cost approximately two cents a page, the appearance of the same or similar books at less than half the price is an event indeed.

Most paper-back books are reprints of books of proven value. In order to produce such books at such low prices, publishers must be assured of a wide sale. It is proposed in this and subsequent issues to review a number of important series of paper-backs.

One such important series is the *Galaxy Book* series published by Oxford University Press. Galaxy Books are priced from $1.50 to $2.95, are exceptionally attractive in format and typography, and with few exceptions are outstanding books first published by Oxford ten to thirty-five years ago. Not all the titles in the series (now including eighteen titles) will appeal to readers of this journal. But the following six ought to be in the library of every well-read minister. Undoubtedly many will own some of these; now it becomes possible to own every one of them at low cost to oneself.

The Idea of History. By R. G. Collingwood (GB 1), 1956. Pp. xxvi, 339. $1.75.

Many readers will recognize this book as the classic statement of the idealist's conception of history by the late Oxford historian, edited posthumously by his friend, T. M. Knox, and first published in 1946. Collingwood begins with Herodotus, the creator of scientific history ("a much better historian than Thucydides"), and traces the development of historiography through its gradual evolution up to the beginning of the twentieth century, fittingly ending from his own idealist point of view with Croce. I have seldom read a book more stimulating and challenging in spite of the fact that (or was it because?) I find myself in fundamental disagreement with its position. But then it is often true that only such books are really worthwhile!

Christianity and Classical Culture. By C. N. Cochrane (GB 7), 1957. Pp. ix, 523. $2.95.

There are books which one reads once with pleasure, but one's thinking is not basically changed by such reading. There are also books which one glances at and then quickly shelves because they are not worthy of a careful reading. Occasionally, however, there appears the rare book which one ponders, and re-reads, and one is never quite the same afterwards. In my own experience Cochrane's was such a book. I first read Cochrane in 1947, seven years after it first appeared and one year after the death of the author. This is the fourth time I have read the book and I am almost as excited about its contents as at first acquaintance. The struggle between the Classical World, the *Romanitas* of Augustus, and the world of Christianity in the first four centuries of our era is told in clear and scholarly fashion by the late professor of Greek and Roman History at University College in the University of Toronto.

From MAX WEBER: Essays in Sociology. Transl., ed., and with an Introduction by H. H. GERTH and C. W. MILLS (GB 13), 1958. Pp. xi, 490. $2.25.

Max Weber (1864–1920) was undoubtedly the greatest and most versatile social scientist and philosopher of his generation, if not of the last century. No other individual has had such influence in determining modern thinking in the theories underlying political science, sociology and economics. The book under review, first published in 1946, contains only a selection of his writings, but they are well-chosen. Whether he writes about the social sciences, or about history, philosophy or religion, the result is always profound. Essays which will particularly appeal to readers are those entitled "The Social Psychology of the World Religions," "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism," and "Religious Rejections of the World and their Directions."

The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational. By R. OTTO, translated by J. W. HARVEY (GB 14), 1958. Pp. xxi, 232. $1.75.

This is the English translation of Rudolph Otto's famous book *Das Heilige* (1st ed., 1917), which first appeared in 1923. No thoughtful student of religion as such can disregard Otto's inquiry. Many terms used by modern students of the phenomenology of religion, such as "the numinous," "the *mysterium tremendum*," and the "wholly other" go back to Otto's book. The book is by no means easy reading, but anyone reading it carefully will find it profoundly creative and at the same time creatively profound.

Prayer: A Study in the History and Psychology of Religion. By F. HEILER, translated by S. MCCOMB with the assistance of J. E. PARK (GB 16), 1958. Pp. xxviii, 376. $2.50.

Friedrich Heiler's *Das Gebet* first appeared, I believe, in 1917, and very quickly became recognized throughout the Protestant world as the great classic on prayer. The English translation of which this is a reprint first appeared in 1932 and immediately won wide recognition. There is no other book in English, or in any other language for that matter, that has penetrated as deeply or has covered the phenomenon as widely as that of Heiler. I could wish that everyone who pretends to talk about prayer in the pulpit or in private would first read and ponder this book.

The Allegory of Love: A Study of Medieval Tradition. By C. S. LEWIS (GB 17), 1958. Pp. 378. $2.25.

The name of C. S. Lewis is well known to readers of the *Journal* for his popular theological books. To literary critics his name is equally well-known

for his outstanding work on medieval allegory. Since its first publication in 1936 it has become an indispensable work to all students of literature interested in the rise and development of "courtly love" and the "allegorical method" from the Age of the Troubadours (11th Cent.) down to Spenser's *The Faerie Queene.*

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BOOK NOTES

New Testament Greek: An Introductory Grammar. By E. G. JAY. London: S.P.C.K. (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre), 1958. Pp. x, 350. $4.20.

THE PUBLICATION of a new elementary N. T. Greek Grammar in English is a sufficiently rare event to warrant some notice. A casual perusal of Jay's work shows a traditional pattern of arrangement, with materials fairly well-graded, and certain advantages in fuller explanations in the earlier part of the book. Its usefulness can of course only be tested by actual use in a class. One suspects that it may well supersede Machen in years to come.

The First Epistle of Peter: The Greek Text with Introduction and Notes. By F. W. BEARE. 2nd revised ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958. Pp. xii, 213. 25/–.

THE FIRST edition of Professor Beare's work appeared about twelve years ago and made a great impact on the world of N.T. scholarship. Since that date a number of important articles and monographs by such scholars as Bieder, Boismard, Carrington, Lohse, Mitton and Nauck as well as the massive commentary by Selwyn have appeared. In the light of these publications Beare's Commentary has been revised with no substantial change in any of his own positions, except that the author now feels that the epistle was probably written in Rome. Beare has brought the commentary up to date by a 20 page supplement at the end of the work as well as occasional corrections throughout the text.

J.W.W.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Inclusion of title in this list neither ensures nor precludes subsequent review in this journal.).

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